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This thesis intends to examine the relationship between private business 
associations and the state in contemporary China. Three private business associations 
in Shanghai were selected. They are the Federation of Industry and Commerce (FIC), 
the Self-Employed Laborers Association (SELA) and Private Enterprises Association 
(PEA). The study aims at answering the following questions: what is the 
development and changes of the three associations compared to their early 
establishment and can they represent the members' interests? To what extent is the 
state's influence on the three associations and are there any changes? What is the 
relationship between them and the state? In order to answer the above questions, 
literature and documentary review and primary data analysis are the basis of this 
study's methodology. 
This study finds that in a corporatist framework of dual management system, the 
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FIC, the SELA and PEA operate differently. The FIC was set up in the 1950s and the 
main objective is to unite and educate the private entrepreneurs一the united front 
function. Over the fifty years since the FIC's establishment, there are no functional 
changes in essence. The state exerts great influence on the FIC's daily work. There is 
a corporatist relationship between the FIC and the state: i t was established by the 
government and under the leadership of the CCP; it can represent members' interests 
to some extent by nominating members to local people's congress and people's 
political consultative conference; and the daily operations are subsidized by the state 
and the leaderships are selected by the government. There are some changes in the 
relationship between the state and the FIC in recent years, especially at the district 
level. The staff does not work for the government blindly and begins to emphasize 
the FIC's economic function and speaks on behalf of its members under their 
pressure. 
The set-up of the SELA and PEA is the outcome of the market reform. They 
were established in the 1980s and 1990s and the initiative behind is to control and 
regulate the individual laborers and private enterprises. There is no functional change 
in essence in recent years. The state exerts great influence on the two associations 
from their establishment. The representative function of the SELA and PEA is weak. 
The staff members focus its control function in the daily work and regard the 
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associations as "work units" for those self-employed laborers. The SELA and PEA 
are more like government appendages instead of social organizations. They are new 
elements of the state's administrative system in the context of economic reform. 
It is argued that the state adopts two different strategies when coping with the 
constituency of private sector: for those high-profile and successful ones the state 
unites them and incorporates them into the policy-making process; for those 
small-scale private enterprises the state controls and regulates them. Because all the 
three associations have close relationship with the state, they are not part of civil 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
l . lThe Rationale of the Study 
Since Chinese leaders adopted the "open door" policy in 1978，the private sector 
economy has developed quickly. At the same time, post-Mao society has seen a 
revitalization of the role of "associations" {xiehui). In order to avoid dangers and 
disorderliness of a freer market, the government established the Self-Employed 
Laborers Association (SELA) and Private Enterprises Association (PEA), together 
with the existing Federation of Industry and Commerce (FIC) to control and regulate 
a private sector which was becoming increasingly complex and difficult to manage. 
With the deepening of the economic reform and maturity of the private economy, 
the state/government is withdrawing from the society and market gradually. Then, 
does the government still exert influence on the above three associations? If yes, to 
what extent? Are there any functional changes in the associations compared with 
their early establishment? And what is the relationship between the private business 
associations and the state in contemporary China? In order to answer the above 
questions, a research is critically in need. 
1.2 The Scope of the Study 
This research intends to examine three private business associations in Shanghai. 
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They are the Federation of Industry and Commerce, the Self-Employed Laborers 
Association and Private Enterprises Association. 
My perspective here is deliberately local rather than national in focus, since it is 
at the local level that the state and society come into the most direct contact. 
However much the nature of the regime is determined at the national level，it is 
through local government that this is made manifest to the people who live under it. 
Thus I organized a case study at the city and city-district level of Shanghai. Shanghai 
is one of the most important economic cities in China and the private economy is 
flourishing there. A detailed look at the three associations in Shanghai will give us a 
clear picture about the changes of the three associations in the context of Chinese 
economic reform. 
1.3 The Objectives of the Study 
The first objective is to examine the development and changes of the three 
associations. Is it true that the three associations have the "dual" function (to regulate 
the private enterprises and to represent the entrepreneurs' interests) as stated by the 
constitution? Compared with the situation when they were established, have there 
been any changes in recent years? 
The second objective is to find out whether the state still exerts great influence 
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on the three associations or not. After examining the daily operations of the 
associations including staff appointment, funding and spending, membership, and etc, 
it is aimed to assess the extent of the state's influence on them. 
The third objective is to discuss the relationship between the private business 
associations and the state in contemporary China. After analyzing the associations 
and the state's influence on them, it is to explore the relationship between them and 
the state. Is it a kind of superior-subordinate relationship or anything else? 
1.4 The Methodology of the Study 
Literature and documentary review, and primary data analysis are the basis of 
the methodology of this research. Literature review included materials such as books, 
journals, articles, etc., from library, the internet, and so forth, as the major sources for 
conceptualization and evaluation. Documentary review involved the study of the 
internet homepage of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce 
(httD://www.acfic.org.cn/). Shanghai Federation of Industry and Commerce 
(http://www.sfic.org.cn/) and federation of industry and commerce of different 
districts in Shanghai as the secondary sources for information. 
Shanghai municipality covers an area of 6340.5 kilometers square and has a 
population of 17 million, and consists of eighteen districts {qu) and one county {xian). 
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All are of equal administrative status and are together governed by the Shanghai city 
government, but each is also governed by its own district-level government. 
Due to the restraint time and manpower, five out of eighteen districts were 
selected as the target of interview, plus the three associations at the city level. The 
five districts are: Zha Bei, Pu Tuo，Hong Kou, Chang Ning and Yang Pu district. I 
went to the three associations in those five districts and conducted interview with the 
working staff there. In order to have a full picture of the three associations, some of 
the members were also interviewed. They included both the self-employed laborers 
(getihu) and private entrepreneurs. The officials of the Bureau of Industrial and 
Commercial Administration (BICA) at the c ity level and in the five districts were 
also interviewed as the BICA is the supervision unit of the SELA and PEA. 
1.5 Significance and Limitations of the Study 
After reviewing various literatures on the topic, I find that the researches about 
social organizations in China mostly emphasize normative aspects. Scholars mainly 
discuss which theory can be used to explain the relationship between social 
organizations and the state in China. As most theories the scholars used are from 
western literature, they may neglect some important empirical findings. There are 
even fewer studies about the individual and private business entrepreneurs and their 
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associations. Additionally, there is no systematic study about the Federation of 
Industry and Commerce, the Self-Employed Laborers Association and Private 
Enterprises Association. 
This research is empirical oriented. It selects Shanghai as a case study to 
examine the relationship between the three private business associations and the state. 
In order to have a full picture of the above three associations, this research undertook 
extensive field work to answer the research questions. Not only is the perspective of 
the three private business associations considered, but also that of individual and 
private business entrepreneurs is included. Besides, the officials of the Bureau of 
Industrial and Commercial Administration were also interviewed as the BICA is the 
supervision unit of the SELA and PEA. I believe that this study will make a 
substantial contribution to our understanding of the FIC, the SELA and PEA and 
enrich the positive aspect of studies conducted on the topic. 
In addition, this research discussed the relationship between the FIC and the 
PEA, which was not included in the earlier literature. A close look at their 
relationship is necessary to see whether that relationship has impact on the daily 
operations and their relationship with the state. 
Before any further discussion, it may be appropriate to mention a few 
limitations of the study. As the limited time and manpower, the study focuses only on 
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one selected city~Shanghai and its different districts. It may neglect some important 
practices in other places. Therefore, the conclusion of the study may only achieve a 
low level of generalization. In addition, due to the difficulty to approach more 
members, the study could only interview a small pool of members. Their views on 
the association may not represent all members' views. 
1.6 The Organization of the Study 
This thesis is organized into six chapters. After the introductory chapter, chapter 
2 reviews two important theories in political science which explain the relationship 
between state and society. They are theories of corporatism and civil society. 
Scholars' discussions on the applicability of corporatism/civil society to China are 
also reviewed. Some studies on the private business associations in China are 
introduced. Chapter 2 serves as a conceptual framework for the later discussion of 
the three associations' relationship with the state. Chapter 3 briefly introduces the All 
China Federation of Industry and Commerce, and then examines Shanghai FIC and 
its district chapters from the documentary review and interview results. The extent of 
the state's influence on the FIC is examined and the relationship between the FIC and 
the state is discussed. Like Chapter 3, Chapter 4 first introduces China 
Self-Employed Laborers Association and then examines Shanghai SELA and PEA 
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and its district chapters. Then it assesses the state's influence on the two associations 
and discusses their relationship with the state. Based on Chapter 3 and 4，Chapter 5 
discusses the relationship between the FIC and the PEA and finds a complex 
relationship between them. At last, a brief conclusion summarizes the main findings 
and arguments of this thesis. It is argued that the state adopts two different strategies 
when coping with the constituency of private sector: for those high-profile and 
successful ones the state unites them and incorporates them into the policy-making 
process; for those small-scale private enterprises the state controls and regulates them. 
With the deepening of the economic reform the state's influence on the three 
associations is still great. The relationship between the FIC and the state reflects the 
state corporatist features. In recent years, there are some changes in the local chapters 
that t he FIC b egan t o s trive f or t heir m embers' interests. Although t he SELA and 
PEA exhibit some state corporatist features, state corporatism cannot be applied to 
analyze their relationship with the state. It is better to regard them as the government 
appendages. With heavy dependence on the state—the FIC's working staff are civil 
servants and most of the revenues come from the government and the BICA provides 
the SELA and PEA's top personnel and assists to collect membership fee, it is 
difficult for the three associations to become part of a civil society. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
Before examining the development and changes of the three associations in 
detail, a literature review about other scholars' studies on the private business 
associations or social organizations in China is necessary. They can be used as 
background information before I examine the associations in Shanghai. Besides, two 
theories of corporatism and civil society that explain the relationship between state 
and society will be reviewed as a conceptual framework. The two theories are 
selected because they describe two different frameworks within which the state and 
social organizations interact. 
2.1 Theory of Corporatism and Its Criticism 
2.1.1 Definition of Corporatism and Two Different lypes 
According to Philippe C. Schmitter, "Corporatism can be defined as a system of 
interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited 
number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and 
functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the 
state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective 
categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and 
articulation of demands and supports” (Schmitter, 1979, p. 13). 
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Besides Schmitter, Howard Wiarda utilized three characteristics to distinguish 
corporatism from other forms of interest representation: 
1. a strong directing state, 
2. restrictions in interest-group freedom and activity, and 
3. incorporation of interest groups into and as part of the state system, responsible 
both for representing members' interests in and to the state and for helping the 
state administer and carry out policies. (Wiarda, 2002, p. 20) 
In an ideal-type corporatist system, at the national level the state recognizes one 
and only one organization (say, a national labor union, a business association, a 
farmers' association) as the sole representative of the sectoral interests of the 
individuals, enterprises or institutions that comprise that organization's assigned 
constituency (linger & Chan，1995, p. 30). The state determines which organizations 
will be recognized as legitimate and forms an unequal partnership of sorts with such 
organizations. The different organizations in each industry are hierarchically ordered, 
and that reflects the opportunity and distance between them and the state. The 
associations sometimes even get channeled into the policy-making processes and 
often help implement state policy on behalf of the government. 
Among the different types of institutional arrangements that come under the 
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rubric of corporatism, the side of the spectrum that democracies such as Australia, 
Britain and Japan occupy is often referred to as liberal or societal corporatism, in that 
the leaders of the peak associations are beholden to their memberships, not the state, 
and the state is not directly in a position to dictate the terms of agreement between 
sectors (Unger & Chan，1995，p. 31). At the other end of the spectrum from such 
societal corporatism lies what is variously called authoritarian or state corporatism, 
where the weight of decision-making power lies very heavily on the side of the state 
(Unger & Chan，1995, p. 31). Under state corporatism, the govemment may even 
take charge of creating and maintaining all of the corporatist organizations and may 
grant itself the power to assign and remove their leaders at will. The state exercises a 
top-down control on the associations. 
2.1.2 Some Critiques on Corporatism 
Corporatism is a theoretical framework which attempts to describe how the state 
preserves its dominance either by granting greater autonomy to licensed 
organizations or by creating its own organizational network in order to pre-empt the 
threat of the emergence of autonomous associations. Perhaps the most obvious doubt 
surrounding corporatism is that it comes in so many versions that it is impossible to 
pin down. Corporatism represents more of a shared approach to the analysis of 
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organized interests and their relationship with the state. Moreover, there is the point 
that different writers do not agree as to what corporatism is a model of. Corporatist 
writers have variously presented it as an economic system, a state form, a form of 
interest intermediation and a "mode" of policy making (Williamson, 1989，p. 189). 
Such differences of opinion can be confusing and make it difficult to apply in any 
reasonably systematic manner. 
Although Schmitter's definition is innovative and provides a reference point for a 
host of writers on corporatism, it is often criticized by many for being far more 
descriptive of statist or top-down forms of corporatism than of societal forms of 
corporatism. Many scholars thought his definition was far too constrictive, focusing 
primarily on authoritarian regimes，so a s t o exclude a variety ofnon-authoritarian 
corporatist regimes and structures. Others criticize that his ideal-typical model 
“seems rather arbitrary in its selection of the types and range of structural elements 
included" (Williamson, 1985，p. 148). To operationalize it the analyst will have to 
clarify what is meant by the terminology of the various components such as 
"recognized", "licensed" or "created", but there is little or no guidance about how to 
remain true to ideal-typical corporatism. 
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2.2 Theory of Civil Society and Its Criticism 
2.2.1 Definition of Civil Society 
The meanings attached to "civil society" in the west are so various. David Held 
offered a sociological definition, which said that "civil society retains a distinctive 
character to the extent that it is made up of areas of social life—the domestic world, 
the economic sphere, cultural activities and political interaction~which are 
organized by private or voluntary arrangement between individuals and groups 
outside the direct control of the state" (Kaviraj & Khilnani，2001，p. 206). From this 
definition, we can see that "relative autonomy from the state" is the essential feature 
of civil society. Civil society is out of the control of the state. 
To White, "civil society" denoted two broad categories of meaning: (1) civil 
society = political society. In this conception, "civil society" describes a particular 
type of political relationship between state and society based on the principles of 
citizenship, rights, representation and the rule of law (White, 1993，p. 65). It would 
focus on the nature and feasibility of political democratization along liberal lines. (2) 
civil society = intermediate social associations. It refers to organizations and 
associations enjoying some autonomy vis-a-vis the state and formed voluntarily by 
members of society for their own protection or self-interest (White, 1993, p. 66). 
When applied to China, civil society defined as intermediate social associations 
12 
which are autonomous from the state seems more appropriate. 
There are four perspectives on civil society drawn from the western literature. 
They are: civil society as a parallel polis; civil society as citizenship; civil society as 
political development; and civil society as governance. Civil society as a parallel 
polis means restoring the civil society which has been crushed by the state using the 
nonviolent methods. This concept of civil society was reborn in the 1970s，primarily 
in Eastern Europe. Dissidents were able to create alternative structure outside the 
state, a polis that was parallel to the state (Brook & Frolic，1997，p. 49). 
The second perspective on civil society means good citizenship. It was 
originally the Greek polis. Civil society was polite and civil, and it was elitist, since 
only a few men of virtue were citizens. Good citizenship can develop only over time 
and requires a community of rational, self-directing individuals who can elevate their 
private interests to a consideration of the greater public good (Brook & Frolic, 1997， 
p.52). In the long journey from subject to citizens, as from authoritarianism to 
democracy what counts is not only the development of individual and particular 
interests but the commitment of these interests to the public good. 
The most common perspective on civil society is based on the great 
transformation of relations between state and society in the modem era in Europe. 
The key events were, first, the separation of church and state; second, the rise of the 
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capitalist economy; and third, the creation of the modem bureaucratic state (Brook & 
Frolic, 1997，p. 53). The process of political modernization demands a crucial space 
between a changing state and society, in which individuals interact and define 
themselves in relationship to the political. Civil society is that space and it serves to 
mediate political participation and change. 
The fourth perspective on civil society is that civil society provides effective 
management. Ideally, civil society lubricates the political system and links the 
various parts together. In “politically developed" western systems, a civil society is 
vital for obtaining "democratic" governance. In other political systems, fascist, 
monarchical, or authoritarian, a functional version of civil society is essential just for 
providing effective management. Civil society was a mechanism which evolved to 
prevent disorder and maintain links between the new state and the changing society. 
"Linkage", which facilitates governance rather than democracy, is the short-term, 
utilitarian essence of civil society (Brook & Frolic, 1997，p. 55). 
2.2.2 Some Critiques on Civil Society 
It is problematic when applying the above four perspectives on civil society to 
China. For example, the idea of restoring a civil society that had been crushed by the 
state may have made sense in Eastern Europe, but it was problematic in China, which 
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barely had a tradition of civil society in its past. China lacked a critical mass of 
dissident intellectuals willing to challenge authority. Much of the energy of China's 
intellectuals and dissidents was consumed in trying to persuade the state to change 
itself, rather than overthrowing it through the creation of a parallel polis. This 
strategy was in keeping with the Confucian tradition that intellectuals should serve 
the state. 
This concept of civil society as good citizenship assumes individuals had private 
interests when they were subject, and then after long journey from subject to citizens, 
they could commit the private interests to the public good. In China, it is a different 
story. We can call Chinese people "subject" as they seldom participate in the political 
life. However, from traditional China to contemporary China, from Confucianism to 
the ideology of the Communist Party, it is always emphasized that individual's 
interest should be subject to the collective/state interest. Thus, although Chinese 
people are "subject", they commit their interest to the public good. But there is a long 
way from "subject" to "citizens" in the sense of political participation. Civil society 
as citizenship in the Greek ideas is not applied to China. 
Civil society as political development is based on the modem western 
experience and has a western bias. Western thinking about civil society is linked to 
the emergence of capitalism, the modem state, and democracy. But China has barely 
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experienced the separation of state and society, the powerful influence of capitalism, 
and the rise of the modem industrial state. Why presume to look in today's China for 
a civil society that is linked to developed capitalism and democracy? 
Frolic sees two kinds of civil society in today's China. One emphasizes the 
opening up of the political system, limitations on state power, and the advancement 
of the rights of autonomous groups and individuals (Brook & Frolic, 1997，p. 56). 
That is, civil society as political development in western concept. This civil society is 
still poorly developed and is struggling to maintain itself in China. The second is 
state-led civil society. It is created by the state, principally to help it govern, but also 
to co-opt and socialize potentially politically active elements in the population 
(Brook & Frolic, 1997，p. 56). It refers to hundreds of thousands of social 
organizations and quasi-administrative units created by the state to help it manage a 
complex and rapidly expanding economy and changing society. 
It seems such kind of state-led civil society and state corporatism share a lot of 
common characteristics: both are created and recognized by the state, hierarchically 
ordered, a form of interest articulation and etc. Then why did Frolic use another term 
when he himself admitted state-led civil society was a form ofcorporatism? I f i n 
state-led civil society, the social organizations enjoy some degree of autonomy, then 
it can be placed between state corporatism and societal corporatism. It may be the 
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reason why Frolic used the term "state-led civil society". 
2.3 The Applicability of Corporatism/Civil Society to China 
2.3.1 Discussions on Corporatism 
Corporatism and civil society are two theories frequently used by scholars when 
they analyze the social organizations in China. Among them, some argue that state 
corporatism represents a shift from a Party command system that dominated directly 
to one that dominates partly through surrogates as the Chinese state moved further to 
free up the economy and to relax direct Party controls over society during the 1980s 
(linger & Chan，1995, p. 38). They also predicted that at least some of the old "mass 
organizations" and new associations would shift gradually in a "societal corporatist" 
direction under the influence of their designated constituencies and began to speak 
on behalf of their constituencies some years after (Unger & Chan, 1995，p. 52). The 
evidence Unger and Chan provided is based on Schmitter's definition which is 
criticized by many scholars. 
State corporatism is an institutional arrangement associated with authoritarian 
system such as Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, etc. To make the concept more acceptable 
or more applicable to China (a socialist country), Pearson put forward the concept of 
"socialist corporatism". To her，the central idea of socialist corporatism is that 
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socialist state licensed intermediate functional organizations and devolved authority 
to them (Pearson, 1994, p. 34). These functional organizations are not equivalent to 
the autonomous western-style interest groups: they are intended to serve as the "aide 
of the Party and government" in the economic reform effort, and the state 
accordingly plays a central role in the establishment and management of such groups 
(Pearson, 1994，p. 35). There seems no key difference between Pearson's socialist 
corporatism and Schmitter's definition of corporatism. 
Not only western scholars but also some Chinese scholars agree that a state 
corporatist structure is emerging in China. For example, after comparing today's 
social organizations with the state-society relationship before 1976 when the state 
fully controlled society, Kang concluded at current time the state and society 
cooperated with each other while the state was still in the dominant role (Kang, 1999， 
p. 13). He further predicted in the future the society would become more autonomous 
and independent of the state and social organizations would actively cooperate with 
the state. A socialist corporatist framework will b e established. Kang's research is 
still at its initial stage and normative, lacking actual cases to support his argument. 
Besides those who argue corporatism could be used to analyze social 
organizations in China, others argue that though corporatism may exist in form in 
China, it does not exist in essence. Based on an empirical analysis of the pattern of 
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state-business interaction in Huantai county, Shandong, Yep argued that the political 
reality in China differed from the corporatist description on two counts: business 
organizations do not function as vehicles of effective communication between state 
and society; and the heterogeneity among managers also hinders the possibility of 
collective exchange with the state. He thought a new form of exchange was emerging 
which was more a kind o f collaboration between partners, instead of a corporatist 
relationship under which the state held a dominant role (Yep, 2000，p. 566). The 
concept of corporatism in Yep's article is societal corporatism. If he had examined 
the Huantai county from the perspective of state corporatism, the conclusion might 
have been different. That is because the state corporatism does not emphasize the two 
conditions Yep pointed out. The control role of the state is more important in state 
corporatism. Nevertheless, he pointed out one essential thing: when applying 
corporatism, we should not only focus on its form (the rules or laws regulating the 
social organizations and the daily operations), but also on the essence (whether the 
social organizations represent the members' interests or not). 
2.3.2 Discussions on Civil Society 
As mentioned above, civil society is another theory used by scholars to analyze 
the social organizations in China. As early as the 1990s, White conducted an 
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empirical research in Xiaoshan city and found that the new social organizations in 
that city represented a mixture of public and private spheres in which the public 
continued to dominate and they cannot be described as "independent" organizations, 
but they did exercise (to various degrees) a limited sphere of autonomy (White, 1993， 
p. 85). He argued that only embryonic elements of "civil society" could be detected 
in both major categories of intermediate organizations in Xiaoshan. He further 
predicted that with the economic reforms continued and economic development 
proceeded apace, these socio-economic forces would grow in strength and a more 
powerful ‘‘civil society" would emerge. The problem of White's argument is that he 
didn't take consideration of the role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 
Whether such a "transformation" will occur depends on how much autonomy the 
Party will tolerate. 
Although some scholars find corporatism is likely to emerge and develop in 
China, others argued it was just a temporary phenomenon and with the deepening of 
the market reform, a civil society would emerge (Wang & Tang，2001，p. 40). In 
today's China, social organizations and the state are in the status of "co-existence" 
(Wang & Tang，2001，p. 39). That is, the government depends on social organizations 
to manage the corresponding constituency while social organizations depend on the 
state's authority and funding to develop. They argued that the trend was social 
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organizations got rid of the dependency on the state and finally became the key 
components of a civil society. Their research is normative and relies on western 
theory's applicability to China. 
Civil society is a concept based on the western experience of the powerful 
influence of capitalism and the rise of the modem industrial state. After conducting a 
survey and interview project targeting the owners and operators of large and medium 
scale private enterprises and the local party and government officials in eight 
counties, Dickson found in the areas that were most economically developed and 
where privatization had advanced the furthest, the views of entrepreneurs were more 
supportive of the state's leadership than was the case in less prosperous areas, which 
is in sharp contrast to the theories of civil society. Instead he found the CCP's 
corporatist strategy (to include certain new groups into the political arena, 
particularly entrepreneurs and those with scientific and technical expertise, while at 
the same time excluding participation by others) was successful (Dickson, 2003，pp. 
83-84). Dickson's research shows that civil society as a theory to explain 
state-society relationship in China has its limits. 
Different from White who analyzed social organizations in Xiaoshan city from 
the perspective of civil society, Wang et al. argued that the social organizations in 
China were different from those in western country. They pointed out that social 
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organizations in China did not act as some independent organizations in opposition to 
the state. Instead they share with the government their behaviors and goals etc (Wang, 
Zhe & Sun, 1993, p. 132). The problem of their argument is that the definition of the 
social organization is not consistent with the empirical findings. They defined social 
organizations as non-profitable and non-governmental; however, most social 
organizations in China are quasi-governmental. Secondly, there are some problems in 
the research methodology. They selected the social organizations in Xiaoshan as 
research target, but did not divide them into different categories when analyzing 
them. There are different types of relationship between different social organizations 
and the state. Failing to divide them cannot give us a whole picture of the 
relationship. 
2.3.3 Social Organizations: both corporatist and civil society features? 
From above, we can conclude that there is no consensus on which 
theory~corporatism or civil s o c i e t y i s more applicable to China. Thus, some 
scholars in their research argued that we could find both corporatist and civil society 
features in Chinese social organizations. One of them is Shue. She conducted a 
research in two largely rural Chinese localities—Xinji and Anxi during the second 
half of 1990. Through her interview, she found some relatively incorporated and 
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state-dominated associations (e.g. the Xinji association of the self-employed) at one 
extreme and some relatively self-constituted, self-governing and autonomous 
organizations at the other (e.g. chive fanners association in Xinji's Junqi village) 
(Migdal, Kohli & Shue，1994, pp. 78-79). 
From White's investigations of both national and local social organizations in 
China, they exhibit elements of both the civil society and corporatist models, 
reflecting impetuses from both the state and society. On the one hand they could 
observe functional divisions, monopolistic elements, singular representation, and 
state selection of leaders, features which typify corporatist systems of intermediation; 
on the other hand they could identify voluntary, autonomous and self-regulating 
tendencies, which are organizational characteristics of civil society (White, Howell & 
Shang, 1996，p. 126). While in their current form they serve the interests of both state 
and society, the former still predominate. White's research excludes those 
“unofficial” social organizations which do not register with the state and thus do not 
play the corporatist game set by the state. 
Additionally, Ding also doubted that the model of corporatism may not be 
adequate in view of the fast proliferation of unofficial and voluntary associations in 
spite of the controlling effort of the state, and the increasingly confrontational 
approach taken by some local union branches. He found that at the county level, 
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unofficial associations were concentrated in the areas of cultural life, whereas most 
official and "semi-ofFicial"^ associations were found in the areas related to politics 
and the economy. Besides, there is a tendency for the society to create more and 
more associations, and the government may find it difficult to put a stop to this 
growth. All those are signs of a civil society. Therefore, Ding concluded that the 
concept of corporatism could be better applied to the political and economic areas, 
while the concept of civil society was probably applicable to the cultural and 
intellectual areas. The three associations I intend to study belong to the economic 
areas and I will discuss whether Ding's conclusion is right or not in the later parts. 
Contrary to those scholars who find both corporatist and civil society features of 
social organizations, Saich argued that it was problematic to use either civil society 
or corporatism to analyze the state-society relationship in China. After examining 
some social organizations in China, Saich concluded that while social space had 
opened up, the state had continued to retain a great deal of its organizational power 
and had moved to dominate the space and reorganize the newly emergent 
organizations (Saich, 2000, p. 139). Thus he argued that China was far from creating 
1 A classification of social organizations in terms of their "popular nature" produces three 
categories—"official", "semi-ofFicial" and "purely popular". In an "official” social organization, the 
main leaders and work personnel are appointed by a specific state agency and its finances are either 
paid directly by the state or are subject to strict legal regulation. In the case of a "semi-official" 
organization, the link with a state organization is looser. Its main leaders hold concurrent posts in their 
sponsoring organization and its finances can come from either the state or its own revenue. Last, the 
"purely popular" social organization has no overlapping of personnel of its sponsoring state 
organization and depends on its own finances. 
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a civil society. But he thought each social organization in China had negotiated with 
the state its own niche (Saich, 2000，p. 139). In some cases, the outcome may be a 
close "embedded" relationship with the state; in others it may entail formal 
compliance while operating strategies of evasion and circumnavigation of the state. 
Thus, it is problematic to use either civil society or corporatism to analyze the 
state-society relationship in China. Saich's research suggests that western 
theories~corporatism or civil society may not be applicable to China. It is more 
appropriate to study social organizations in China in its own context. 
2.4 Studies on the Private Business Associations in China 
In addition to the discussions on the social organizations in general, there are 
also some studies on the private business associations. For example, Nevitt examined 
the Self-Employed Laborers Association (SELA) and the Industrial and Commercial 
Federation (ICF) in Tianjin. He mainly analyzed them from the incentives guiding 
the a ssociations，s taff: "a big fish in a s mall p ond" vs. "ladder of a dvancement"^. 
From this perspective, the petty entrepreneurs of the SELA are a poor resource base. 
2 Local officials pursuing the traditional ladder-of-advancement strategy are highly motivated toward 
pleasing their superiors at the next higher level. Their careers are not necessarily tied to the fortunes of 
local institutions but to fulfilling the expectations—and hopefully impressing一the officials and 
institutions of the level above. By contrast, local officials pursuing the "big-fish-in-a-small-pond" 
strategy are very interested in the fortunes of local institutions. They are concerned with developing 
their own local networks of power and support, and with pursuing those actions that are in the best 
interest of these local political constituencies (Nevitt, 1996，p. 38). 
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Thus, district SELA chapters simply concentrate on fulfilling their control functions 
but do not waste district government resources pursuing their interests. By contrast, 
the ICF represents a local resource base of considerable potential and can often serve 
as an engine for local development. Therefore, district ICF chapters are actively 
engaged in pursuing the interests of their private entrepreneur members. Nevitt did 
think the ICF was evolving into what could be identified as part of a civil society. 
Nevitt，s analysis of staffs incentives provides another angle to examine the private 
business associations. 
Foster argued that China's business associations could be more fruitfully studied 
as new elements of the state's administrative system than as participants in a 
state-society dialogue. His research in the city of Yantai showed that nearly all 
business associations there were created at the initiative of the state and Party 
officials，and that they were in essence appendages of government or Party 
organizations. Thus he argued the concept of corporatism was of limited usefulness 
in describing and understanding association-state relations in contemporary China. 
He agreed with Ray Yep that in many cases, although we saw the structural form of 
corporatism, these arrangements were not, in their essence, corporatist (Foster, 2002， 
p. 63). 
In another article, Unger conducted an investigation of three associations in 
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Chaoyang district of Beijing (the SELA, the PEA, and the FIC). She argued that the 
SELA and PEA were corporatist in form but not in essence; they only ineffectually 
pretended to reach out and penetrate the small-scale business community (Unger， 
1996，p. 818). Nevertheless, the FIC seems to be gravitating toward societal 
corporatism as it has been carving out a role of actively representing large private 
interests to the local and central governments. But it hasn't reached societal 
corporatism because the organization is still too tightly bound to the party-state in its 
structure and staffing. 
Besides Unger, Li also conducted a study on the SELA in Beijing~the Haidian 
district chapter. Different from Unger, Li analyzed it from the perspective of the 
model of exchange relations between association and its members. She argued that 
the exchange of power and service between the association and its members could be 
served as the internal dynamics of organizational development (Li, 2004，p. 56). The 
members release the power to the SELA and the SELA provides service to its 
members. But she also found in reality social organizations usually depended on the 
state to establish its authority over the members (Li, 2004，p. 67). She predicted that 
with the deepening of the administrative reform, the dependency of social 
organizations on the state would decrease. Because her study focused on the Haidian 
district SELA, it may have its speciality. 
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Wenzhou is one of the districts in China where the private economy flourishes. 
Chen and Ma examined the civil commercial chambers and trade associations in 
Wenzhou from the angle of institutional analysis. They found the institutional supply 
of the chambers there was not only by themselves but also by governments (Chen & 
Ma, 2003). Different from the SELA and PEA in Beijing, the chambers in Wenzhou 
are self-governing organizations. They gave us another picture about the relationship 
between the chambers and the state and suggested that different cities in China had 
different experience in the development of private business associations and their 
relationships with the state. Thus it is my interest to find the development of private 
business associations in Shanghai. 
To conclude, on the one hand, there are various studies on the social 
organizations in China, at the national level or district level; in the urban areas (city) 
or in the rural areas (county). However, there is no consensus on which 
theory~corporatism or civil society~is more applicable to analyze those social 
organizations. On the other hand, there are not many detailed studies on the 
relationship between the three private business associations (the FIC, the SELA and 
PEA) and the state. Some scholars did conduct research on those associations in 
some cities as Tianjin and Beijing. The ones in Shanghai haven't been studied yet. 
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Therefore, I intend to examine the FIC, the SELA and PEA in Shanghai and discuss 
their relationship with the state in later chapters. 
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Chapter 3 The Federation of Industry and Commerce 
The major organizations set up to represent and oversee the private sector are the 
Federation of Industry and Commerce (gongshanglian), the Self-Employed Laborers 
Association {geti laodongzhe xiehui) and Private Enterprises Association (siying qiye 
xiehui). In this chapter, I will first have a look at the All China Federation of Industry 
and Commerce (ACFIC) as background information to have a general view in mind. 
Then the focus of this research""“Shanghai Federation of Industry and Commerce 
(SHFIC) and its district chapters will be examined from the documentary review and 
the interview results. And finally there will be a discussion on the relationship 
between the FIC and the state. 
3.1 The All China Federation of Industry and Commerce 
3.1.1 Establishment and Objectives 
The All China Federation of Industry and Commerce was established in 1953 
and its nature and status can be generalized as a people's organization and 
non-governmental chamber of commerce composed of Chinese industrialists and 
business people under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, an 
organization assisting the government to manage China's non-public economy, and 
also a bridge linking the Party and Government and non-public economic personages 
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(A brief introduction to the ACFIC，2003). The ACFIC is also known as the China 
General Chamber of Commerce (CGCC)^. It is under the supervision of Party's 
United Front Department. In the mid-1980s, in a bid to give further sectoral 
representation to China's growing body of private entrepreneur, the ACFIC joined 
the Democratic Parties as a constituent member of the Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC). 
The working objectives of the ACFIC are to perform its functions as a people's 
organization and non-governmental chamber of commerce of the united battlefront^ ， 
to unite, help, guide and educate all members, to provide the members with good 
services, to bring up a team of activists who firmly adhere to the leadership of the 
Party and the socialist road with Chinese characteristics, to promote a healthy 
development of non-public economy, to take efforts for the harmonious development 
of socialist material, political and spiritual civilizations, and to m ake eventually a 
great contribution to the great rejuvenation of the nation (A brief introduction to the 
ACFIC, 2003). 
3 The ACFIC is the name for domestic consumption, while chamber of commerce is typically used for 
international activities because that is a name more familiar to their counterparts in other countries. 
4 United battlefront is a Chinese Communist Party strategy that attempts to utilize an organization or 
movement for the purpose of building a consensus and an organized following for party-supported 
programs and goals. Historically, the t e n n i s associated with the Guomindang-Chinese Communist 
Party first united front (1923-27) and second united front (1937-45). FIC was established in the 1950s 
united front strategy of including capitalists in the policy deliberations of the state. And its status is 
equivalent to one of the eight so-called democratic parties. 
31 
3.1.2 Functions of the ACFIC 
In addition to its role as a bridge from the Party and the Government to 
industrial and commercial agents external to the formal Communist Party system, the 
ACFIC is charged with the performance of numerous functions that make its position 
unique. Specifically, it is empowered to: (i) nominate members to the CPPCC and the 
National People's Congress (NPC), and propose bills to the NPC to promote the 
interests of its members; (ii) effect liaison with government officials on policies and 
regulations affecting non-public business development; (iii) organize such economic 
events as trade fairs, exhibitions, technology exchanges, and other networking events; 
(iv) promote foreign economic and technological cooperation and trade, and support 
linkages between Chinese and foreign companies; and (v) disseminate information 
on government policies, markets, new technology, and many other things (Asian 
Development Bank, 2003，p. 49). 
3.1.3 Organization, Staffing and Budget 
The ACFIC is organized into nine departments and employs 166 staff members 
(Asian Development Bank, 2003，p. 46). The departments (with staffing numbers in 
parentheses) are: General office (61), Study and Research Office (14), Liaison (14)， 
Membership (17)，Publicity and Education (15)，Information and Consultation (16), 
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Economic (15)，Legal (6) and the Communist Party Committee Office (6) (Asian 
Development Bank, 2003, p. 46). A secretary general supported by one deputy 
secretary general heads the ACFIC. 
Figure 3.1 Organizational chart of the ACFIC 
Chairman 
Vice Chairman (5) 
Secretary General 
Deputy Secretary General 
General Study & Member- Publicity Info & Economic Liaison Law Party 
Office Research ship Dept &Educa- Consulta Dept Dept Dept Committee 
Office tion Dept -tion Office 
The ACFIC，s revenues comprise an annual government appropriation and the 
fees from organizing events for members. According to the report by Asian 
Development Bank, based on an average cost per employee of up to 30,000 yuan, the 
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ACFIC's staffing costs could be as much as 5 million yuan (Asian Development 
Bank, 2003, p. 48). Adding nonstaff costs would push the ACFIC's annual expenses 
to as high as 7-10 million yuan (Asian Development Bank, 2003, p. 48). In addition, 
the government appropriates separately expenses for trade fairs and special projects. 
In the aggregate, the vast ACFIC system could be costing the public budget more 
than a billion yuan annually (Asian Development Bank, 2003，p. 48). 
3.1.4 Structure, Local Chapters and Membership 
With 3, 059 local organizations at and above the county level, the ACFIC now 
has formed a nationwide network of its own. Below the county level, there are some 
18,481 chapters at the township and community level. The relationships of the 
federation of industry and commerce (FIC) at various levels are informal and quite 
loose. There is no financial and/or administrative link between different levels. Each 
FIC is independent and is supported by its respective local government, which 
provides its local chapters with budgetary support. The national FIC (ACFIC) 
provides guidance to the provincial and local FICs. The provincial FICs provide 
guidance to their respective local chapters. 
The membership of the ACFIC is voluntary. Most members are successful 
siying enterprises and indeed, the ACFIC seeks out high-profile, successful private 
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enterprises of some scale as members. The membership of the FIC consists of the 
larger private enterprises一those exceeding eight employees and $30,000 in assets. 
The FIC also includes joint ventures, township enterprises, and various other 
categories of group and individual membership, but private enterprises are the largest 
single category of FIC members (Nevitt, 1996，p. 27). The membership of the ACFIC 
is divided into three types: corporate, group and individual members. Each local 
member is also a member of the ACFIC. By the end of 2002, there have been 
altogether 1.64 million ACFIC members in the whole country (A brief introduction to 
ACFIC, 2003). 
3.2 Shanghai Federation of Industry and Commerce and Its District 
Chapters 
Established in 1951, Shanghai Federation of Industry and Commerce (SHFIC) 
was the first federation of industry and commerce at the provincial level. Shanghai 
has 18 districts and one county. Each of them has established its local FIC. By 2002, 
over 9 5% o f s treets and t owns i n Shanghai h ave e stablished t heir r espective 1 ocal 
chapters. There are total 20,422 members by the end of 2004; among them 13,893 
are non-public sector enterprises (Introduction to SHFIC, 2003). 
The main tasks of SHFIC are to participate in the political consultation 
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regarding political, economic and social affairs in Shanghai; to assist the city 
government to manage the non-public sector affairs and to do whatever entrusted by 
the government and related organs; to represent and protect the legal rights and 
interests o f i ts m embers; t o p rovide i ts m embers w ith s ervices o f i nformation a nd 
technology, management, law, accounting, auditing, financing, training, etc.; and to 
enhance connections and friendship between the personages and organizations of 
industry and commerce all over the world and to promote cooperation of economy, 
technology and trade (Introduction to SHFIC, 2003). 
The organization of SHFIC is a little bit different from that of the ACFIC. It has 
eight departments: General Office, Membership Department, Economic Department, 
Liaison Department, Study and Research Office, Publicity and Education 
Department, Human Resources Department, and Private Sector Office (Introduction 
to SHFIC3, 2003). Currently there are one chairman, 5 full-time vice chairmen, 18 
part-time vice chairmen and one secretary general (Introduction to SHFIC2, 2003). 
In the following part, I will discuss SHFIC and its five district chapters in detail 
from the findings of the interview. 
3.2.1 Functional Changes over the Fifty Years 
From the establishment of the FIC, it claims to have "three characters" {san 
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Xing): united front, economic, and non-governmental functions. United front function 
means the FIC is to unite, help, guide and educate all members and to participate in 
the policy making process. Economic function means the FIC is to provide the 
members with good services, e.g. to disseminate information on government policies, 
markets, new technology, and many other things. Non-governmental function means 
the FIC is to represent the private enterprises to promote foreign economic and 
technological cooperation and trade, and support linkages between Chinese and 
foreign companies. Among the three functions, the priority goes to the united front 
function (tongyi zhanxian). Over the fifties years, the function of united front is still 
prior to the other two functions in SHFIC. And it is claimed to be the main difference 
between the FIC and the PEA which is more inclined to its economic function. As a 
United Front Department official declared in a 1991 speech, the Federation "has 
always been a united-front people's organization, rather than chiefly an economic 
organization or a department supervised directly by the government" (Unger, 1996，p. 
809). Surprisingly, this research finds FICs at district level began to emphasize 
economic function. That is because local chapters are closer to their members and 
members regard economic function as more useful to them. They are not concerned 
about the united front function. 
Because of the government appropriation and high membership fee, there is a 
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lot of funding for the FIC to organize activities. The FIC provides training services, 
business advisory services, assistance dealing with government agencies, and 
assistance dealing with banks and other financial institutions to their members. 
Besides, members usually get information on market, government policies and 
financial services from the FIC. The private enterprises have their own technology, 
so they seldom get information on that aspect. In addition, members get political 
honors from the FIC such as the representatives of local people's congress. 
Although there are no functional changes in essence, there are some changes in 
the forms of services the FIC delivers. For example, in the past, the FIC in Chang 
Ning district organized two to three full days' lectures {xuexi ban) annually to study 
the government policies and regulations. But the attendance rate was quite low. Since 
1999，the format of lecture has been changed to the symposium, visits, and forums 
etc (Interview22, Appendix I). As the time is separate, the attendance rate increases 
and the effects are quite good. 
According to the officials in Chang Ning FIC, there are two types of services 
they provide: passive vs. active services (Interview22, Appendix I). Passive service 
means when the members ask the FIC for help, the FIC will provide the service they 
need. It is because there are so many members that it is impossible for the FIC to 
provide active services. Active service focuses OH providing market information. 
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There is no supervision unit for private enterprises, so they have no channel to know 
the relevant policies except from the media. But the media does not cover many 
reports on that aspect. Thus, the FIC organizes the information release conference 
monthly and invites the relevant government departments to release the government 
policies which are welcomed by the members. 
3.2.2 The Representative Function of the FIC 
The FIC is a people's organization assisting the government to manage China's 
non-public economy and a bridge linking the Party and Government and non-public 
economic personages. As an organization representing the successful private 
enterprises of some scale, the FIC represents members' interests by nominating them 
to the p eople's congress and p eople，s p olitical consultative conference where they 
can participate in the policy making process. 
At the city level, among the members there are 30 representatives of the 
people's congress and 50 representatives of the people's political consultative 
conference. The staff of the FIC conducts research, writes and submits the reports 
about the private economy to the two conferences. 
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Table 3.1 The number of FIC members to be the representatives of the two 
conferences (Appendix I) 
\ Numbers Representatives Representatives Representatives Representatives 
\ ofPCatci ty ofPPCCatcity of PC at district of PPCC at 
District \ level level level district level 
FIC \ 
^ 
Zha Bei 2 2 1 24 
Chang Ning 3 2 N.A. >20 
Hong Kou N.A. N.A. >10 >10 
Pu Tuo* N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Yang Pu N.A. N.A. 23 34 
Note: (1) PC=People's Congress; PPCC=People's Political Consultative Conference. 
(2) N.A. = Not Available. 
(3) Due to some reason, the interview in Pu Tuo FIC was not conducted. 
Although there is such a channel for the FIC to recommend its members to the 
two conferences, during its daily affairs, the FIC inclines to work for the government. 
That is because the staff members of the FIC are civil servants who are employed 
and paid by the government. Thus, the FIC will not fight against the government's 
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decisions when there is conflict between the government and members' interests. 
Through the interview, most FIC staff expressed that their association could 
represent the members' interests and the members agreed that the FIC could protect 
their interests, and represented them to communicate with the government organs. 
3.2.3 Funding and Spending 
Government appropriation is the main source of the FIC's revenue. Members of 
the FIC are required to submit their membership fee, but it only accounts for a small 
part of the FIC's total revenue. One exception is that the revenue of Yang Pu FIC 
does not come from the government appropriation. Yang Pu FIC has a commercial 
and residential building, and its revenue is from the rent of that building (Interview 18, 
Appendix I). The government appropriation is usually paid for staff's salaries and 
daily expenditures. The membership fee is spent on the services for the private 
enterprises. Besides, SHFIC is responsible for editing the annual report of "Shanghai 
Private Economy" and that costs around 200,000 �300，000RMB annually 
(Interview 15，Appendix I). 
Table 3.2 The membership fee of the five districts' FICs (Appendix I) 
District FIC Membership Fee 
Zha Bei No standard rate: the bigger the enterprise, the more membership 
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fee it submits 
Chang Ning 3,000RMB for chairman; 
1,000 �2，000RMB for vice chairmen; 
500，800，1,000RMB for regular members 
Hong Kou 500RMB 
Pu Tuo N.A. 
Yang Pu 1,000RMB for those enterprises with a registered capital more than 
500,000RMB; 
600RMB for those enterprises with a registered capital less than 
500,000RMB 
From above, we can see that the membership fee differs a lot among the five 
districts: the least is Hong Kou distr ict500RMB and the most is Chang Ning 
district—3,OOORMB. 
The submission rate of the membership fee is quite low. For instance, in Yang 
Pu FIC the submission rate is only around 30% of the total (Interview 18, Appendix I). 
But the FIC does not care that. It cares more about attracting new members as 
membership is voluntary. According to the staff, when new members want to join the 
FIC, they will enquire about the membership fee. The FIC does not want to prevent 
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new members from joining due to the membership fee. Thus it does not pay much 
attention to the collection of it. 
3.2.4 Membership 
There are over 300,000 private enterprises in Shanghai; among them over 
10,000 are members of SHFIC. The membership rate is low. 
The membership of the FIC is voluntary. In order to recruit more private 
enterprises, the working staff of the FIC visits those successful private entrepreneurs 
and introduces them the functions and services of the FIC. For example, Chang Ning 
FIC first provides services to the potential members and then invites them to join 
(Interview22, Appendix I). 
When an enterprise closes down or moves out，it automatically withdraws from 
the local FIC. 
There is a loose relationship between the FIC and its members. The staff 
explained that because the FIC was not a government department it had no 
administrative sanction. Besides, the members of the FIC are those successful and 
prestigious enterprises. They have other resources to draw upon to solve their 
problems and do not need to rely on the FIC. 
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3.2.5 Selection of Leaders 
There is a general meeting every five years. The party's united front department 
nominates the leaders of the FIC first and the members vote for their leaders at the 
meeting. 
The chairman of the FIC is usually appointed by the government. Most of them 
are government officials. One exceptional case is the chairman of Chang Ning FIC 
who is a private entrepreneur (Interview22, Appendix I). But he is not responsible for 
the daily affairs of the FIC. Most of the vice chairmen are private entrepreneurs. 
Table 3.3 Proportion of private entrepreneurs out of total vice chairmen (Appendix I) 
District FIC Proportion of private entrepreneurs out of total vice chairmen 
ZhaBei 8/11=0.73 
Chang Ning 10/15=0.67 
Hong Kou 4/8=0.5 
Pu Tuo N.A. 
Yang Pu 9/12=0.75 
From above, we can see that the proportion of private entrepreneurs out of vice 
chairmen is high. They are not responsible for the daily affairs as they are busy with 
their businesses. The secretary general who is a civil servant is in charge of the 
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day-to-day affairs of the FIC. But the vice chairmen will express their opinions 
occasionally. Besides, all the working staff members of the FIC are civil servants. 
3.3 Relationship between the Federation of Industry and Commerce 
and the State: are there any changes? 
3.3.1 Corporatist Features of the Dual Management System and 1989 & 1998 
Document 
Before discussing the relationship between the FIC and the state, I'll first 
introduce the dual management system which regulates the social organizations in 
China, including the Federation of Industry and Commerce, the Self-Employed 
Laborers Association and Private Enterprises Association. The three associations are 
operating under that framework or system. Thus it is necessary to discuss the system 
first. 
Dual management system has been in effect since the 1950s, which was 
re-affirmed by the 1989 provisional regulations and then stipulated as a rule by the 
1998 “Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations". 
Dual management system refers to dual departmental being responsible for social 
organization registration, administration and routine activities respectively (Wang, 
2001, p. 213). One is called registration and administration department and the other 
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is the state or Party sponsor, called "supervision unit (yewu zhuguan)". The new 
Regulation stipulates that the registration and administration department should be 
the Ministry of Civil Affairs and its local department at all levels, which is 
responsible for registration of social organizations, modification and cancellation, 
annual examination, supervision of social organizations in the aspect of how they 
carry out the regulations and penalize those who violate the regulations (Wang, 2001， 
p. 213). 
According to the 1998 regulation, the related departments of State Council, the 
local government department from the county-above level, institutions authorized by 
the State Council or the local government from the county-above level can be 
selected as the supervision departments (Regulations on the Registration and 
Management of Social Organizations, 1998, Art 6). Supervision departments are 
responsible for examination before social organizations' registration, modification 
and cancellation, supervising social organizations in order to make them act in 
accordance with constitution, laws and regulations, policies and their charters, first 
check of annual examination, co-operating with Registration and Administration 
Department for dealing with the social organizations' illegal activities, and 
supervising the social organizations' clearing accounts together with other 
departments (Wang, 2001，p. 213). 
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From above, we can find strong corporatist features of the dual management 
system and 1989 & 1998 document. The dual management system strengthens the 
government's supervision, management and control. This causes China's social 
organizations to fulfill government responsibilities and needs, thus they must 
conform to regulations stipulated by the government before they are legally 
registered. Dual management system is designed with a view to help the government 
control and manage social organizations, which is a key feature of state corporatism. 
Besides, the 1989 Management Regulations on the Registration of Social 
Organizations have some corporatist features. First, the requirement to affiliate to a 
superordinate body is a form of state screening and licensing, a corporatist device 
which seeks to distinguish acceptable from unacceptable organizations. Without the 
approval of a supervisory body, social organizations face enormous difficulties in 
registering. This requirement has made it very difficult for more independent social 
organizations to register and it also allows a government department to set up its own 
association to prevent a more popular organization from getting registered. Another 
corporatist feature of the 1989 document is the stipulation that only one organization 
can represent a particular interest or constituency. In a corporatist system, we find a 
limited number of singular and noncompetitive interest representations. This 
effectively limits competition among social organizations and ensures a monopoly of 
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representation (White et a l pp. 103-104). 
Besides the above two features, the 1998 "Regulations on the Registration and 
Management of Social Organizations" also display a third feature of corporatism. 
That is, social organizations must register with the appropriate civil affairs 
department from the county level upwards. This makes it impossible for local groups 
to enroll members from different areas, thus limiting the potential for the spread of 
grass-roots organizations that could develop national or horizontal representation. 
3.3.2 Relationship between the Federation of Industry and Commerce and the 
State 
The Federation of Industry and Commerce was established by the state in the 
1950s when China was in the period of socialist revolution and construction. At that 
time, the FIC was regarded as a people's organization of the united battlefront to 
unite, help, guide and educate the industrial and commercial sector. As the Chinese 
Communist Party represents the interests of workers, those private entrepreneurs 
were out of the state administrative system. Thus the FIC was established as a bridge 
linking the government and the non-public sector. In order to control the FIC, its 
revenues were mainly from the government and its main leaders~chairman and 
secretary general were appointed by the government and its staff members were civil 
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servants. It is a kind of “official" social organization. Moreover, to incorporate the 
FIC into and as part of the state system, it joined the Democratic Parties as a 
constituent member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. And 
it can nominate its members to be the representatives of local people's congress and 
people's political consultative conference. Thus members have the channel to express 
their interests to the state and participate in policy making process on the one hand, 
and the state has the channel to administer and carry out non-public policies on the 
other hand. 
After over fifty years from its establishment, the government still exerts great 
influence on the FIC. That is because: first, government appropriation is the main 
source of the FIC's revenue; and second, the main leaders are appointed by the 
government. The membership fee accounts for a small part of the FIC's total revenue 
and the submission rate is low. The staff does not care the low submission rate but 
relies on the government appropriation. Even in Yang Pu FIC where the revenue is 
not from government appropriation, the influence of the state is still there. That is 
due to the second reason一the leaders are appointed by the government and staff 
members are civil servants. There is a general meeting every five years during which 
the members select their leaders. However, the selection is nominal: the party's 
united front department nominates the candidates and the members vote for their 
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leaders at the meeting. Thus, the chairman of the FIC is usually a government official. 
The exceptional case is the chairman of Chang Ning FIC who is a private 
entrepreneur. But he is not in charge of the daily affairs. Although most of the vice 
chairmen are private entrepreneurs, they are busy with their businesses and express 
their opinions occasionally. Their existence in the FIC can be regarded as nominal. In 
the daily operations of the FIC, it is the secretary general and working staff that are 
responsible for the day-to-day affairs. All of them are civil servants and employed 
and paid by the government. Therefore, the state exerts great influence on the FIC. 
Besides helping the government manage and regulate the private economy, the 
federation of industry and commerce are actively engaged in the advocacy of 
members' interests in recent years, especially at the district level. The FIC is a 
national association officially designated by the state to serve as a "bridge" between 
the state and the private business owners. It is supposed to play a dual function: to 
help the government exercise indirect control over the private sector economy and 
private entrepreneurs, and to serve as the channel o f interest articulation for 1 arge 
private entrepreneurs. Although united front function is primary, the district FICs are 
more c oncemed a bout se rving t heir m embers. T hey change t he f orms of s ervices, 
making them more attractive and provide different services and information that are 
useful to the members. 
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From above, we can conclude that there is a corporatist relationship between the 
FIC and the state. In a corporatist framework, only one organization is recognized by 
the state as the sole representative of the sectoral interests. In China, the FIC is an 
organization recognized by the state to represent the high-profile and successful 
private enterprises of some scale. The staffing of the FIC also reflects the corporatist 
feature that in order to be granted a deliberate representation social organizations are 
in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders by the state. 
As corporatism is a form of interest representation, the FIC in China engages in the 
advocacy of members' interests by nominating members to the two conferences, 
providing different services and assistance dealing with government agencies to their 
members, and etc. 
Although the state exerts great influence on the FIC, there are some changes in 
the relationship between the FIC and the state in recent years. As stated earlier, in the 
district FICs, the economic function of the FIC takes precedence of the united front 
function. It is not simply a focus change but a sign of the changing relationship 
between the FIC and the state. The staff of district FICs has perceived that the 
economic function is more important to their members. The members of the FIC are 
those successful and large-scale private enterprises and they have the power to force 
the association to represent their interests. And the membership is voluntary. The 
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members will withdraw from the association if it does not represent them. The staff 
has realized that and is actively engaged in pursuing the interests of their private 
entrepreneur members. In the past they were told that united front function was the 
most important; at present they regard speaking on behalf of their constituencies and 
representing members' interests as more important although the united front function 
is still emphasized. However, it should be bom in mind that such change is 
happening at the district level currently. At the city level, the staff still considers 
united front function is prior to the economic function. 
Nevertheless, we should not be too optimistic about that change. The FIC is an 
organization established and supported by the government in essence. It is not 
independent as its counterpart in a civil society. It is not formed voluntarily by the 
members and during its daily operations the state exerts great influence. As the FIC 
staff members are civil servants, employed and paid by the government, they incline 
to work for the government when there is conflict between government policies and 
members' interests. Therefore, the FIC will not fight against the government's 
decisions and it cannot fully represent the interests of its members. 
Whether there will be further changes in the relationship between the FIC and 
the state or whether the FIC will enjoy more autonomy as its counterpart in a civil 
society i s determined by the state. The vice chairman of Shanghai FIC thinks the 
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functions of the FIC are determined by the economic and political system of China 
(Interview 15, Appendix I). It is the govemment/CCP to determine the future 
development of the FIC. The FIC will play a more and more important role with the 
deepening of the economic reform. But the precondition is that there are some 
changes in the political system, as one staff in Zha Bei FIC said (Interviews 
Appendix I). 
To sum up, over the past fifty years the state still exerts great influence on the 
FIC from its main functions to its funding and staffing. There are no functional 
changes in essence. Under a corporatist framework of dual management system, the 
relationship between the FIC and the state is like those social organizations with the 
state in a corporatist framework. The FIC helps the government manage and regulate 
the private economy on the one hand; and represents the private entrepreneurs' 
interests on the other hand. It is not a simple superior-subordinate relationship 
between the FIC and the state. 
With the development of the market economy, there are some changes in the 
association, especially at the local level. Unlike its national or city level partner 
which still emphasizes the united front function, the local FICs started to change its 
focus to the economic function and began to speak on behalf of the members' 
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interests. The FIC no longer served the state blindly; it had pressure from the 
members to strive for their interests. That could be regarded as a dilemma: on the one 
hand, the FIC relies on the government from the funding to the staffing; on the other 
hand, it has to fight against the government in some circumstances. Thus, there are 
some changes in the relationship between the FIC and the state. 
In China, the FIC will not evolve into part of a civil society if it means to be 
independent from the state. There are close relationship between the FIC and the 
state: the state provides funding and staffing to the FIC and the FIC helps the state 
unite the successful private enterprises of some scale. A corporatist framework is 
more useful to explain the changing relationship between the FIC and the state. 
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Chapter 4 The Self-Employed Laborers Association and 
Private Enterprises Association 
Besides the Federation of Industry and Commerce which was examined in the 
last chapter, the Self-Employed Laborers Association (SELA) and Private Enterprises 
Association (PEA) are the other two social organizations set up by the state to 
represent and oversee the private sector. In this chapter, I will first have a look at the 
SELA at national level. Then the focus of this research~Shanghai SELA and PEA 
and their district chapters will be examined based on the interview results. And 
finally there will be a discussion on the two associations. 
4.1 The Self-Employed Laborers Association at National Level 
4.1.1 Establishment and Objectives 
As early as 1982，the national government directed that localities should begin 
to organize a self-employed laborers association (SELA) to encompass the petty 
entrepreneurs—the stall-keepers and small family craft and service 
businesses~which the state had decided would be allowed to emerge from among 
China's unemployed (Unger, 1996，pp.797). The central government's Bureau of 
Industrial and Commercial Administration (BICA) was put in charge of the new 
association, and in turn the Bureau's regional offices were delegated responsibility 
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for establishing local branches. By 1985，some 91% of all the counties and cities in 
China reportedly contained SELAs, and so in 1986 a national SELA was formally 
inaugurated. 
Like the ACFIC, China SELA is a people's organization, composed of 
self-employed laborers under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. It is a 
mass organization or a transmission belt for individual operators in keeping with the 
Leninist tradition. The mission of the SELA is to educate the self-employed 
regarding party policy, law, and proper business practices while protecting their legal 
rights and interests (Goldman & MacFarquhar, 1999，p. 276). The national 
Association of the Self-Employed and all its branches exist primarily as means by 
which the party-state may instruct peddlers and traders about proper and permissible 
business practice, and regulate their conduct in the market. The very formation of the 
association in the mid-1980s must be understood as a regulatory response by the state 
to the perceived dangers and disorderliness of a freer market (Migdal et al., 1994，p. 
78). 
4.1.2 Functions of the SELA 
The main functions of the SELA are to: (i) publicize and carry out the 
guidelines and policies of the Party and the Government and strengthen ideological 
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and political work of self-employed laborers; (ii) educate members to abide by laws 
and to maintain social justice and professional ethics; (iii) provide its members with 
services of information and technology; (iv) assist the related government bureaus to 
strengthen the management of self-employed laborers; (v) coordinate the relationship 
between members and related bureaus; and (vi) develop entertainment and sports 
activities (Fei & Zuo，1991, p. 465). 
Because of being self-employed, these individual laborers are left out of the 
"work unit" {danwei) system. One intention to establish the SELA is to make it 
equivalent of the public unit for those self-employed. Like the public work unit, the 
SELA combines political, economic, and social functions. It polices market places, 
attempts to enforce the one-child policy, and organizes study sessions to study new 
laws, party policy, and even Lei Feng. It also organizes product fairs in addition to 
charity drives, speech contests, and sports competitions. Such activities are meant to 
improve the reputation and raise the social position of the self-employed (Goldman 
& MacFarguhar，1999，pp.276-277). In addition to these activities, the SELA claims 
to act as an advocate for individual entrepreneurs who have trouble with other 
government agencies or find themselves in difficulty because of illness or injury 
(Goldman & MacFarquhar，1999，pp. 276-277). 
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4.1.3 Organization, Staffing and Budget 
The organizational structure of the SELA is simpler than that of the ACFIC. It 
has an executive committee of the board of directors {changwu lishihui) which is 
composed of a president (huizhang), several vice-presidents (fuhuizhang), board of 
directors {changwu lis hi) and secretary general (mishuzhang). The executive 
committee sets up an executive organ which is in charge of day-to-day affairs of the 
association under the leadership of general secretary. Government organs provide 
many of the association's top personnel. The SELA cadres are at the same time the 
BICA officials and work in its individual and private enterprise section. Three 
quarters of its funding come from its supervision bureau—the BICA (Pearson, 1997， 
pp. 134). 
4.1.4 Structure, Local Chapters and Membership 
Besides the SELA at the national level, the provinces, cities, and counties 
establish the local SELAs as well. According to the Constitution of China 
Self-Employed Laborers Association, the national SELA provides guidance to the 
local chapters of SELA (Constitution of China SELA, 1991, Art 27). 
Membership is legally compulsory. In the SELA, the self-employed laborers 
automatically become members when they are issued business permits. The 
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membership of the SELA is comprised exclusively of small-scale private 
entrepreneurs—such as peddlers, small retailers, artisans, and the owners of repair 
shops and small restaurants~officially, private businesses with no more than eight 
employees or $30,000 in assets (Nevitt, 1996，p. 27). 
4.2 Shanghai Self-Employed Laborers Association and Private 
Enterprises Association and Their District Chapters 
Shanghai Self-Employed Laborers Association was established on 3 April, 1986. 
Similar to the FIC, the eighteen districts and one county of Shanghai established 
respective local SELAs. 
The main tasks of Shanghai SELA are to: (i) educate and organize members to 
study the laws, statutes and policies; (ii) organize members to conduct 
self-management and assist the government and related bureaus to supervise and 
manage the self-employed laborers; (iii) protect the "legitimate" rights and interests 
of members against arbitrary officials, communicate their opinions and demands to 
higher levels and provide legal consultancy; (iv) disseminate information on markets, 
spread new technologies and other things and help solve problems of individual 
businesses; (v) organize training; (vi) report the development of individual economy 
to the government and related organs and make suggestions on policies and laws; and 
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(vii) develop cultural and sports activities and take care of the needy members 
(Introduction to Shanghai SELA, 2003). 
The Shanghai SELA has four departments: General Office，Publicity and 
Education Department, Grass Roots Department and Service Department (Ma & Liu， 
1993，p. 145). 
Local and provincial branches of the private enterprises association (PEA) were 
set up b y the BICAb eginning in the late 1980s and early 1 990s to accommodate 
medium-sized entrepreneurs such as this. The Chinese Communist Party leadership 
has not established a PEA at the national level, where an organization already exists 
to represent the private sector, namely the ACFIC. Most provinces, cities and 
counties have established the local PEAs. 
Shanghai PEA was established on 27 December 1991. It intends to serve as a 
bridge between the Government and the Party and the private sector. The eighteen 
districts and one county of Shanghai established their local PEAs. 
The main tasks of Shanghai PEA are similar to those of the SELA. The only 
difference is that the members of the PEA are composed of private enterprises while 
those of the SELA are composed of individual laborers (getihu). The official dividing 
line between a getihu and a private enterprise is determined by the number of 
full-time personnel it employs: when a business reached eight or more it was to 
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become a private enterprise. The membership of the PEA is compulsory. 
Compared to the SELA, the organizational structure of the PEA is simpler. 
When it was established in 1991，there was one president, seven vice presidents, one 
secretary general and two deputy secretaries general (Ma & Liu, 1993, p. 172). The 
secretary general is in charge of day-to-day affairs of the association. 
From the Constitution of the PEA, the revenues of the PEA come from: (i) 
membership fees; (ii) various appropriations; (iii) donations; and (iv) others 
(Constitution of Shanghai Private Enterprise Association, 2001, Art 17). 
Like Shanghai SELA, the PEA is under the supervision of the BICA as well. 
During the interview, it is found that the two associations are under the leadership of 
one president. And there are two secretaries general in charge of the SELA and PEA's 
operations respectively. The two associations are operated in the same place and by 
the same group of staff. The only difference between the two associations is the 
targets they serve. They essentially comprise one batch of people under two different 
signboards {yiban renma, liangkuai paizi). Thus, in the following part, I will combine 
the two associations for examination and discussion. 
4.2.1 Organizational Structures of the SELA and PEA 
The SELA and PEA a re one group of people under two different signboards. 
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Thus, there is one president in charge of Shanghai SELA and PEA, and two 
secretaries general in charge of the daily affairs of the SELA and PEA respectively. 
Vice presidents of Shanghai SELA and PEA are individual laborers and private 
entrepreneurs. The rest working staff is recruited from society and has to attend the 
short courses {peixun ban) before taking up their work. One exception is that the 
SELA and PEA in Chang Ning district are in two different places (InterviewlO&ll， 
Appendix I). They are the only SELA and PEA in Shanghai that operate separately. 
Therefore, the SELA and PEA in Chang Ning district have their own president. 
The SELAs and PEAs in Shanghai are divided into three layers. The first layer 
is the city level: Shanghai SELA and PEA. The second layer is the district level: 
district SELA and PEA. And the third layer is the street level: the working 
committees. 
Table 4.1 No. of BICA officials in the SELA and PEA (Appendix I) 
District SELA and PEA No. of BICA officials 
Zha Bei 2 
Chang Ning 4 
Hong Kou 4 
Pu Tuo 2 
Yang Pu* 5 
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Note: Yang Pu SELA and PEA have more BICA officials because Yang Pu district is 
larger and has more population than the other four districts. 
From above, we can conclude that the closeness of the SELA and PEA with the 
state is not as great as that of the FIC with the state from the perspective of 
associations' staffing. The staffing of the FIC including main leaders and working 
staff are civil servants while most working staff of the SELA and PEA are recruited 
from the society except the president and secretary general who are BICA officials. 
4.2.2 Functional Changes 
Similar to the FIC, there is no functional change in essence in the two 
associations compared to their early establishment. Although the SELA and PEA are 
established as the bridge between the government and private sectors on the one hand 
and to represent the interests of individual laborers and private enterprises on the 
other hand, they emphasize their control function in the daily operation. According to 
the BICA staff, the SELA and PEA are social organizations to the outside; and 
regarded as one department of the BICA to the inside. The daily operation of the two 
associations is under supervision of the BICA. Their function is mainly to assist the 
BICA to control individual laborers and private enterprises. Not all associations I 
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interviewed had the same feeling. For instance, the president of Yang Pu PEA held a 
different view and thought there were some functional changes in the PEA: from 
serving the government in the past to serving both the government and members 
(Interview 17, Appendix I). Only by doing so, the association can have vitality. 
Like the FIC, the forms and the propagandistic slogans of the services the SELA 
and PEA provide have been changed. The functions of the SELA and PEA are from 
"three characters" to "eight words". The "three characters" means the political (the 
propaganda of policies, laws and regulations), economic (the provision of market 
information) and social (the liaison between associations and members) functions 
they provide. The “eight words" are "representation {dai biao), serving (fu wu\ 
coordination {xie Had), and self-regulation (zi /v)". The staff explained that with the 
development of the market economy, the advocacy of "three characters" was out of 
date. They thought the “eight words" expressed the functions of the SELA and PEA 
more clearly and was also the goals the two associations intended to achieve. From 
the interview, it was found the two associations focused on serving and 
self-regulation functions in the daily affairs. Representation of members' interests is 
not enough. 
The different district chapters provide varieties of services to their members. For 
example, Chang Ning SELA provides direct and indirect services to its members 
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(Interview 10, Appendix I). Direct services are those the SELA sends towels, soaps 
etc to the members in summer; and blankets and gloves in winter. Indirect services 
are those training courses and provision of legal consultation. Another example is the 
branch in Zhonghua Xin Road, Zha Bei district established a mutual aid committee 
and set up mutual aid funds (Interview2, Appendix I). Every individual laborer 
submits 50RMB. When any member has difficulties, the mutual aid funds will help 
him or her. 
4.2.3 The Representative Function of the SELA and PEA 
Different from the FIC, the SELA and PEA cannot nominate members to local 
people's congress and people's political consultative conference. 
The secretary general of Hong Kou PEA said that the representative function of 
the PEA was weak (Interview20, Appendix I). Currently it is a quasi-governmental 
organization. If the BICA could withdraw from the daily operations of the SELA and 
PEA, they would become a genuine non-governmental organization. The BICA 
officials also admitted that there were few circumstances that the SELAand PEA 
would represent members' interests because of its official background. It is an 
institutional problem. And it is the government that the SELA and PEA serve instead 
of the members. 
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The vice president of Pu Tuo SELA had the same thoughts. The working staff of 
the two associations is accountable to their president (the vice director general of the 
BICA) instead of their members (Interview 13, Appendix I). As the SELA and PEA 
are highly dependent on the BICA's support, the priority of the SELA and PEA is to 
serve the interests of the government and the BICA. It is difficult for the SELA and 
PEA to represent members' interests. They try to change the situation, but within the 
Chinese political and economic system, they can do nothing. 
Different from them, the secretary general of Chang Ning PEA held an 
optimistic view (Interviewll, Appendix I). He thought his association could 
represent members’ interests from the views of members. However, from his 
conversation it is him whom the members recognize instead of the association. He is 
a civil servant and the CCP member, and regards serving the members is the most 
important. Thus the members recognize him and his work but still regard the PEA as 
a government organization to control them instead of representing their interests. 
Because of his outstanding work, some successful private enterprises joined the PEA. 
For example, there is one representative of the CPPCC, two representatives of 
Shanghai People's Congress and one representative of Shanghai People's Political 
Consultative Conference among the members of Chang Ning PEA. Over thirty 
members are at the same time members of Chang Ning FIC. The case of Chang Ning 
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district shows that although the staff cannot change the system, they can change their 
attitudes and serve the members. They can make the members recognize them first, 
and then step by step，the members will recognize the association. 
The vice president of Yang Pu PEA also thought his association could represent 
the members' interests (Interview 17, Appendix I). He gave an example. During the 
period of SARS, the government required all restaurants to close down. Then the 
PEA asked the government not to close all restaurants based on their sanitary status. 
And because of SARS, the businesses of individual laborers and private enterprises 
were bad. The PEA succeeded in persuading the BICA to exempt them from one year 
tax and management fee. 
In interviews with both the staff and members of the SELA and PEA, the staff 
seemed more inclined to be up-beat about their association by emphasizing its 
achievements in its relations with the state and its o verall usefulness to members, 
while the members seemed inclined to be more dismissive, believing that their 
association had only been able to help them with relatively minor problems. The 
members hold the associations in very low regard. The SELA and PEA members 
have fewer resources to draw upon than the FIC members, and in particular do not 
have close ties with influential officials. When personal ties are so difficult, relying 
on their association seems to be the only option for the SELA and PEA members. But 
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it is not the case. When faced with any kind of business problem, the members 
indicated that the SELA and PEA would be the last place they went for help. The 
association usually cannot solve the problems they face, thus they won't ask the 
association for help. One member said that he could not find the SELA for help when 
he faced problems, so he solved it by himself (Interview6, Appendix I). 
4.2.4 Funding and Spending 
In the past, some of the associations' revenue came from their supervision 
bureau一the BICA. Since 2001，there is no appropriation from the BICA. The 
membership fee is the only source of revenue. One exception is that Zha Bei SELA 
and PEA still get 30% of their revenue from Zha Bei BICA (Interview2, Appendix I). 
Table 4.2 The membership fee of the SELA and PEA (Appendix I) 
SELA and PEA Membership fee of the Membership fee of the PEA 
SELA 
Shanghai 120~240RMB 900RMB for those enterprises 
with a registered capital more than 
2，000，000RMB; 
700RMB for those enterprises 
with a registered capital between 
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1,000,000 ~ 2,000,000RMB; 
500RMB for those enterprises 
with a registered capital below 
1，000，000RMB 
Zha Bei 120RMB 300 � 6 0 0 R M B 
Chang Ning 200RMB for those doing 900RMB for those enterprises 
business outside the with a registered capital more than 
market; 2,000,000RMB; 
lOORMB for those doing at least 400RMB for regular 
business inside the market members; 
200RMB for those enterprises 
suffering a loss 
Hong Kou 180 � 2 4 0 R M B 800RMB for those enterprises 
with a registered capital more than 
1,000,000RMB; 
600RMB for those enterprises 
with a registered capital 500,000 � 
1，000，000RMB; 
400RMB for the privately owned 
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enterprises 
Pu Tuo 120 � 2 4 0 R M B 400，600, 900RMB 
Yang Pu 120RMB 400，600，900RMB 
From above, we can conclude there is no standard membership fee in different 
districts of Shanghai. It seems to be determined by the business status of members. 
Zha Bei and Yang Pu districts are relatively poorer than the other three. So the 
membership fee of the SELA in those two districts is relatively fewer. The 
membership fee of the PEA does not differ a lot among the five districts because it is 
not much already. 
The membership fee is the only source of the SELA and PEA's revenue, so the 
revenue is not as much as the FIC's. The limited revenue does not have much 
influence on the SELA and PEA's daily operations. The staff makes a budget 
according to the amount of revenue. The reason may be that the SELA and PEA have 
no need to organize large-scale activities because their members are individual 
laborers and small-scale private enterprises. 
Some of the district SELA's revenues are submitted to Shanghai SELA. For 
example, 10% of Chang Ning SELA's revenue is submitted to Shanghai SELA and 
5% to 10% of Hong Kou SELA and PEA's revenue is submitted to Shanghai SELA 
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and PEA (Interview 10&20，Appendix I). 
The revenue is used to pay for the working staffs salaries, daily expenditures, 
and services for the members. 
4.2.5 Membership 
There are currently over 260,000 individual laborers, and among them 230,000 
are members of Shanghai SELA (Interview 12, Appendix I). The coverage rate is 88%. 
Additionally, there are over 300,000 private enterprises, and among them 200,000 are 
members of Shanghai PEA. The coverage rate is 67% (Interview 12, Appendix I). 
Table 4.3 Members of the SELA and PEA (Appendix I) 
The SELA members The PEA members 
Zha Bei district Most individual laborers are Most private enterprises 
the SELA members are the PEA members 
Chang Ning district 2,000-3,000 members out of Most private enterprises 
6,000 individual laborers are the PEA members 
Hong Kou district Over 90% individual laborers 90% private enterprises 
are the SELA members are the PEA members 
Pu Tuo district All of the individual laborers 1/3 private enterprises are 
are the SELA members the PEA members 
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Yang Pu district* 59% individual laborers are 32% private enterprises 
the SELA members are the PEA members 
Note: In 2003，the SELA and PEA in Yang Pu district re-registered their members. 
The percentage here was the data got from 2004 summer field work and it is not the 
final number. 
From above, the membership rate of the SELA and PEA is higher compared to 
that of the FIC. It is because the membership is compulsory. During the interview, 
the staff expressed that the SELA and PEA had begun to adopt the voluntary policy 
when recruiting new members (Interview 10, Appendix I). The members said that 
although it was voluntary to join the association currently, in fact the membership 
was still compulsory (Interview 19, Appendix I). 
Although the membership rate of the SELA and PEA is high, there is a loose 
relationship between members and associations. Over 50% of the members have no 
idea about where the two associations are. For example, during the interview，the 
members in Zha Bei district said they did not feel the existence of the SELA, only 
knowing they submitted 120RMB membership fee annually (Interviews&8， 
Appendix I). There is not much communication between the association and its 
members. One individual laborer said the SELA was a nominal association. He 
72 
didn't know how much the membership fee was. The officials in the BICA came to 
collect it and he submitted (Interview6, Appendix I). 
If the membership is not compulsory, some individual laborers said they would 
not join the SELA any more. Others said they would still join the association as it 
was better to have an organization to depend on and when they faced problems in the 
future they could ask the association for help. 
4.2.6 Selection of Leaders 
Like the FIC, there is a general meeting in the SELA and PEA every five years. 
The working committees nominate the candidates first and the members vote for 
their leaders at the meeting. The president of the SELA and PEA is the vice director 
general of the BICA who is in charge of private economy. Actually the president, 
secretary general and vice secretary general of the SELA and PEA are assigned by 
the BICA. Selection of leaders is just a form. 
Most of the vice presidents of the SELA and PEA are individual laborers and 
private entrepreneurs. They are busy with their businesses and are not responsible for 
the daily affairs. Their existence can be regarded as nominal. 
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4.3 The Self-Employed Laborers Association and Private Enterprises 
Association: a new form of government appendages? 
The context of establishing the SELA and PEA is different from that of the FIC. 
With development of the private economy, an organization is necessary to be set up 
to educate the individual laborers and private entrepreneurs and provide services to 
them. Therefore, on July 19 1986，the state approved the establishment of China 
SELA and put it under the supervision of the BICA. Some years later, the PEA was 
set up by the government to accommodate medium sized private enterprises. 
From the SELA and PEA's early establishment, the state exerted great influence 
on them. Firstly, the SELA and PEA were set up and licensed by the government and 
were under fairly strict control of its superior organ, the BICA. The constitution of 
the SELA and PEA states directly that they are mass organizations under the 
"leadership" of the Party and government and receive the guidance of the BICA. And 
one of the important functions of the associations is to control and regulate the 
individual laborers and private enterprises. Secondly, the associations' main leaders 
were the BICA officials and three quarters of its funding came from the BICA. There 
is a selection of leaders every five years, but it is nominal. The president of the SELA 
and PEA is usually the vice director general of the BICA and the secretaries general 
who are in charge of the associations' daily affairs are BICA officials. 
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When compared to the FIC, the SELA and PEA are not as close to the state as 
the FIC. All of the FICs working staff members are civil servants while most staff of 
the SELA and PEA are recruited from society. In recent years, the SELA and PEA's 
funding no longer comes from the BICA's appropriation. It comes entirely from 
membership fee. And most of the working staff's salaries are from membership fee 
except the BICA officials in the SELA and PEA. From this sense, the SELA and PEA 
operate like social organizations and the state's influence on them is not as great as 
on the FIC. 
One may argue that the SELA and PEA~several steps further removed from 
the government than the FIC, with most staff recruited from society, and with fully 
financial dependence on their membership~would seem more likely to exhibit de 
facto civil society characteristics. In fact, the opposite is the case: the SELA and PEA 
in Shanghai do very little in pursuing their members' interests. Most district SELA 
and PEA cadres are not particularly interested in serving the needs of their 
membership at all; their institutional loyalties lie very firmly with the BICA. The 
members hold the associations in low regard, and that the SELA and PEA are among 
the last places they will go for help when faced with any kind of business problem. 
Most of the SELA and PEA members who were interviewed expressed the view that 
it was the best to avoid interactions with officialdom. 
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The reason may be that although membership fee is the only source of the 
associations' revenue, the collection of membership fee is still dependent on the 
BICA. During the interview, I was told that the staff of the SELA and PEA did not 
collect membership fee because they had difficulty to do that. It is the BICA officials 
who collect it when they ask the individual laborers or private enterprises to submit 
the management fee. Secondly, the main leaders一the president and secretary general 
are the BICA officials and it is them that are in charge of the daily affairs. Different 
from the FIC staff that begins to speak on behalf of their members, the staff in the 
SELA and PEA simply concentrates on fulfilling their control functions but does not 
waste resources pursuing the members' interests. Thirdly, the SELA and PEA were 
set up and licensed by the government. The BICA is the supervision bureau of the 
SELA and PEA. It is the BICA that appoints the leaders of the SELA and PEA. Thus 
the two associations won't do anything that is not allowed by the bureau. Both the 
BICA officials and staff of the SELA and PEA admitted that the SELA and PEA were 
quasi-governmental organizations. The BICA provides guidelines and supervision for 
the SELA and PEA. Every year the two associations submit their annual plan, 
working reports and annual summary to the BICA, and the BICA examines and 
approves the activities the SELA and PEA plan to organize. Thus we can conclude 
that the SELA and PEA are still under tight control of the state. 
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The relationship between the SELA and PEA and the state is of some state 
corporatist characteristics. The SELA is the social organization to represent the 
individual laborers and small-scale private enterprises with no more than eight 
employees and the PEA is the one to represent private enterprises with more than 
eight employees. Both of them were set up and licensed by the government. Besides, 
the BICA provides the associations' top personnel and help the associations collect 
the membership fee. The membership is obligatory in the SELA and PEA since 
entrepreneurs are forced to join at the point of registering their businesses with the 
local government. Although the staff said they had begun to adopt voluntary policy 
when recruiting new members, the members did not think so and still regarded 
joining the SELA or PEA as compulsory. That is because as long as the SELA or 
PEA is connected with the BICA, the membership is compulsory. 
However, I should argue that the state corporatist framework only exists in 
structural terms. It does not exist in essence. The two associations do not really play 
an intermediary function between their assigned constituencies and the state. 
Although the constitution stresses dual control and advocacy functions, they are 
supposed to perform minor advocacy functions. During the daily operations, the 
emphasis is put on how to help the BICA control and regulate the individual laborers 
and private enterprises. The representative function is limited by their status and 
77 
nature. The associations are accountable to their president~the vice director general 
of the BICA—instead of their members. The government is so competent and strong 
that the associations can only play a marginal role. Thus the SELA and PEA can be 
regarded as appendages of the BICA. The relationship is just like the SELA and PEA 
are one department of the bureau. It is reflected in the conversation with one district 
SELA staff. The secretary general of Chang Ning SELA hoped that the BICA could 
pay more attention to the SELA and she hoped her work could satisfy the BICA 
leaders (Interview 10, Appendix I). 
Besides, other government bureaus also regard the two associations as the 
BICA's appendages. For example, the secretary general of Chang Ning PEA said that 
the other government bureaus did not regard the PEA as a social organization when 
he contacted with them (Interviewll, Appendix I). Instead they regarded it as a 
department of the BICA. The vice president of Pu Tuo SELA shared the same view: 
it was easier to conduct work under the name of the BICA than under that of the 
SELA or the PEA (Interview 13, Appendix I). 
During the interview, some staff of the SELA and PEA expressed they wanted to 
change the situation and to represent their members' interests. The secretary general 
of Zha Bei PEA said the association not only did what the BICA assigned, but also 
expanded its services when necessary (Interview�，Appendix I). The secretary 
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general of Shanghai SELA said in the past the two associations were the bridge 
between the government and the private economy; while in the future they should 
provide more services to their members and represent or even strive for the members' 
interests (Interview 12, Appendix I). Otherwise, there was no need for them to exist. 
Besides, he hoped the representative function of the SELA and PEA could be 
strengthened so that they could nominate members to the two conferences. As 
currently the SELA and PEA are one group of people under two different signboards, 
the staff hoped the two associations would be separated in the future because of the 
different constituencies they served. But above are just staffs personal thoughts and 
there is no sign that they apply what they think to their daily work. Members still 
hold the associations in low regard and associate them with government departments. 
To conclude, there are some changes in the SELA and PEA from their early 
establishment. They change from “official" organizations to "semi-official" 
organizations, exhibiting some corporatist features. But there is no essential change 
in their relationship with the state. They are just the bridge between the government 
and private sector. The main reason is that the establishment of the two associations 
is not for interest representation but for state control. With the private economy 
developed in the 1980s, the government authorized the BICA to set up the SELA and 
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PEA as a response to the perceived dangers and disorderliness of a freer market. The 
establishment of the SELA and PEA was to keep the individual laborers and 
small-scale private entrepreneurs which were out of the public work unit system in 
control. The SELA and PEA do provide a lot of services to their members. But the 
emphasis is put on how to help the BICA control and regulate the increasingly 
complex private sector. Therefore, the SELA and PEA can be regarded as new 
elements of the state's administrative system with some corporatist features. 
Although there are some changes in the SELA and PEA in recent years such as 
the funding no longer coming from the government, the state still exerts great 
influence on the two associations. The SELA and PEA are under fairly strict control 
of the BICA一main leaders are the BICA officials and the collection of membership 
fees relies on the BICA. Not like the FIC where the staff began to speak on behalf of 
their members, the SELA and PEA，s cadres regarded fulfilling their control functions 
as the most important. The reason may be that the members of the SELA and PEA 
are those small-scale private enterprises and they have no power to force the 
associations to represent their interests. Besides, there is not much room for the 
SELA and PEA to develop when other government bureaus regard them as the 
BICA's department instead of independent social organizations. Therefore, the two 
associations are government's appendages under the veil of social organizations. 
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Chapter 5 The Relationship between the Federation of 
Industry and Commerce and the Private Enterprises 
Association 
In the last two chapters I examined the FIC, the SELA and PEA in Shanghai and 
discussed their relationship with the state. We know that the members of the SELA 
are self-employed laborers and small-scale private entrepreneurs and those of the FIC 
are high-profile and successful private enterprises, so there is no relationship 
between the SELA and the FIC. But there are some overlaps in the membership of 
the FIC and the PEA. A discussion on the relationship between the two private 
business associations is necessary to see whether that relationship has impact on their 
daily work and their relationship with the state. 
5.1 The PEA as A Group Member of the FIC 
The PEA represents private enterprises with more than eight employees while 
the FIC represents high-profile and successful private enterprises of some scale. Thus, 
there are some overlaps in the membership of the FIC and the PEA. From the 
interview, it is found that Shanghai PEA is the group member of Shanghai FIC. 
Usually the leaders of the PEA are leaders of the FIC at the same time, and vice versa. 
For example, the vice chairman of Shanghai FIC is the vice president of Shanghai 
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PEA and he attends the meetings held by the PEA. 
Among the five districts' PEAs I interviewed, all are group member of the local 
FIC except Hong Kou PEA. The staff of Hong Kou PEA said their relationship with 
the FIC was not so good, thus they did not join the FIC as a group member. 
As the FIC is a member of the people's political consultative conference and the 
PEA is only regarded as a department of the BICA, the FIC holds a higher political 
status than the PEA and receives more resources from the government. District 
leaders usually attend the meetings of the FIC and members also attend. On the 
contrary, district leaders do not attend the meetings held by the PEA and so the 
members' attendance rate is low. 
5.2 The FIC and the PEA: lack of interaction 
Since there are some overlaps in the membership of the FIC and the PEA, in 
many instances, there is duplication of activities between the FIC and the PEA, with 
the two associations competing in supplying certain services to its members. Despite 
these overlaps, it has observed that, in general, there seems to be a lack of 
coordination and cooperation between the FIC and the PEA at the working level. 
The main function of the FIC is to represent the largest and most prestigious 
private enterprises, thus it does not represent all private enterprises and it also does 
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not intend to. The daily work of the FIC is focused on its united front function and it 
offers political honor by nominating its members to the two conferences. Compared 
to the FIC, the PEA focuses on its economic function. Usually there is no interaction 
between the PEA and the FIC except a joint meeting annually to share the 
development of private economy because the FIC has no channel to gain that 
information. In some cases the two associations cooperate. For instance, Shanghai 
FIC and Shanghai PEA once assisted the Hong Kong enterprises to hold a 
recruitment talk in Shanghai (Interview 12, Appendix I). Besides, the PEA helps the 
FIC recruit new members. 
5.3 Perceived Competition between the FIC and the PEA 
Although there is not much interaction between the FIC and the PEA, their staff 
still feels some competition from each other. Most FIC staff thought there was no 
competition between them because the FIC provided free services to its members. 
The staff of Yang Pu FIC held a different view and said there was some competitive 
relationship between the FIC and the PEA (Interview 18, Appendix I). Some PEA's 
staff h ad t he s ame v iew. F or example, t he s ecretary general o f Zha Bei PEA s aid 
there was some competition between the PEA and the FIC (Interview2, Appendix I). 
Thus she did not tell the FIC about the PEA's daily affairs. The secretary general of 
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Hong Kou PEA also felt some pressure from the FIC (Interview20, Appendix I). So 
she tried to provide better services to attract or maintain the members. She also 
thought the FIC could provide better services to its members as it had more resources 
from the government. 
From the interview with the BICA officials, it is surprised to know that there is 
some competition between the FIC and the BICA (Interview9, Appendix I). That is 
because the FIC wants to incorporate the PEA as it regards itself as the representative 
of private enterprises. But the BICA did not agree. The BICA has the first-hand 
information about the private enterprises, thus the PEA is updated with the 
information about the development of their members. If the PEA is combined into 
the FIC, it will lose that function and it is also difficult for the FIC to collect the 
membership fee. The members also expressed that they felt there was some conflict 
between the leaders of the FIC and the PEA. 
5.4 Perceived Advantages by the FIC and the PEA's Staff 
Although the staff feels some competition from the other association, it does not 
have much influence on their daily work. The reason is that the staff holds their own 
association in high regard. Both the staff of the FIC and the PEA emphasize the 
advantages of their association over the other one. On the one hand, the staff of the 
84 
PEA said the PEA had some advantages in its daily work. Due to the close 
relationship with the BICA, the PEA knows the development of individual laborers 
and private enterprises. The FIC has no such channel. Besides, the PEA issues one 
magazine called "Information Expressage" (xinxi kuaidi) which is about the 
government policies and market information to its members twice a month. The 
magazine is useful to its members and welcomed by them. The secretary general of 
Chang Ning PEA said during his daily work, he did not have any pressure from the 
FIC and did not care the functions of the FIC (Interviewll, Appendix I). To him, the 
PEA responds quickly to the needs of its members. When the members have 
difficulty (e.g. industrial or commercial problems), they will prefer to ask the PEA 
for help. He said that the private enterprises joined the FIC for the sake of political 
interest as the FIC could nominate members to local people's congress and people's 
political consultative conference. 
On the other hand, the vice chairman of Shanghai FIC said compared to 
Shanghai FIC, Shanghai PEA had less representative function (Interview23, 
Appendix I). That is because: first, the administrative rank of the chairman of the FIC 
is higher than that of the PEA. The chairman of the FIC is a national leader while that 
of the PEA is the director general of the BICA. Second, the members of the FIC have 
the power to push the FIC to represent their interests because they are high-profile 
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and successful private enterprises. The members of the PEA do not have such power 
because they are small-scale private enterprises. Third, because of the status of the 
FIC, there is some relationship between the FIC, city government, city people's 
congress and people's political consultative conference. The FIC can help the private 
entrepreneurs solve their financing problems which they usually face when 
conducting businesses. Thus Shanghai FIC has more channels and resources to 
represent their members. But the district FIC's staff members are not as optimistic as 
the vice chairman of Shanghai FIC. For instance, the staff in Zha Bei FIC said due to 
the close relationship with the BICA, the PEA provided a variety of services to its 
members (Interviews, Appendix I). The reason why district FICs feel some 
competition from local PEAs may be that the economic function of the FIC is more 
emphasized at the district level. In that aspect, due to the close relationship with the 
BICA, the PEA has some advantages over the FIC. At the city level, united front 
function of the FIC is more important, and in that aspect, the PEA cannot compete 
with the FIC. That is why the city level and district level of the FIC hold different 
views to the PEA. 
From above, we find what the staff of the FIC and the PEA care most is not the 
quality of services they provide or the members' views towards the association. What 
they care is the closeness of the association to the government and they think that is 
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the most important. As the FIC is a member ofthepeople 's political consultative 
conference, it can nominate its members to the conference and people's congress. In 
other words, the FIC has a strong representative function. That is what the PEA 
pursues and cares. Due to the close relationship with the BICA, the PEA has an 
updating understanding of the market and development of private economy, which 
the FIC lacks. The relationship between the FIC and the PEA fits the state corporatist 
framework, where the associations struggle for the closeness with the state. 
To conclude, there is a complex relationship between the PEA and the FIC. As 
the PEA is the group member of the FIC, there is cooperation in some aspects. 
Although there is not much interaction in the daily operations of the two associations, 
both of them feel some competition from each other. Different districts have different 
experience. Some feel the existence of the FIC threatens the functions of the PEA 
while others feel nothing. But the feeling of competition does not have much 
influence on their daily work. The reason is that the staff believes they have their 
own advantages: the FIC has more representative power while the PEA emphasizes 
its economic function. The complex relationship between the FIC and the PEA does 
not affect their relationship with the state. In fact the advantages of the two 
associations come from their status and their closeness with the government. 
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Therefore, in today's China, it is the state that decides the social organization's 
functions and social organization cares more about its closeness with the state. The 
state exerts great influence on the social organizations. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
The economic reform since 1978 provides an opportunity for the private 
economy to develop in China. With the development of both the economy and social 
organizations, some associations were set up to represent the private sector. Due to 
the restraint time and manpower, this thesis selects Shanghai as a case study and 
examines three private business associations there—the Federation of Industry and 
Commerce, the Self-Employed Laborers Association and Private Enterprises 
Association. The FIC represents high-profile and successful private enterprises of 
some scale. The members of the SELA are those small-scale private enterprises with 
no more than eight employees and those of the PEA are private enterprises with more 
than eight employees. All the three social organizations are operated under China's 
dual management system. 
The thesis aims at answering the following questions: what is the development 
and changes of the three associations compared to their early establishment and can 
they represent the members' interests? To what extent is the state's influence on the 
three associations and are there any changes? What is the relationship between them 
and the state? 
In order to answer the above questions, literature and documentary review and 
primary d ata analysis are the b asis of this s tudy's m ethodology. B esides S hanghai 
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FIC, SELA and PEA, the s tudy s elected five districts in Shanghai，and conducted 
interview with the staff of the three associations, some members and the BICA 
officials. The interview results were mainly used to discuss and analyze the 
development and changes of the three associations and the state's influence on them. 
In order to answer the relationship between them and the state, theories of 
corporatism and civil society are reviewed and used as a conceptual framework. 
Other scholars' discussions on the application of the two theories to China are also 
included. Studies on the private business associations in China are used as reference 
when analyzing the interview results. As the arguments and conclusions of this thesis 
are based on the field work in Shanghai, this research may neglect some important 
practices in other places and only achieve a low level of generalization. 
The study finds that in a corporatist framework of dual management system, the 
FIC, t he S EL A and P E A o perate d ifferently. Although t he t hree a ssociations w ere 
established by the government, the initiative is different. The FIC was set up in the 
1950s and the main objective is to unite and educate the private entrepreneurs—the 
united front function. With the development of the private economy, the united front 
function is still a priority, especially at the national and provincial/city level. The 
set-up of the SELA and PEA is the outcome of the market reform. They were 
established in the 1980s and 1990s and the initiative behind is to control and regulate 
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the individual laborers and private enterprises. 
Over the fifty years since the FIC's establishment, there are no functional 
changes in essence. That is, the united front function is a priority, together with the 
economic and non-governmental function. There are some changes in the forms of 
services that the FIC delivers. The FIC cannot fully represent their members' 
interests as the staff members are employed and paid by the government. When there 
is conflict between government policies and members' interests，the staff inclines to 
work for the government. The state exerts great influence on the FIC's daily work. 
The funding of the FIC is mainly from the government and all the staff members are 
civil servants. There is a corporatist relationship between the FIC and the state: it was 
established by the government and under the leadership of the CCP; it can represent 
members，interests to some extent by nominating members to local people's congress 
and people's political consultative conference; and the daily operations are 
subsidized by the state and the leaderships are selected by the government. There are 
some changes in the relationship between the state and the FIC in recent years, 
especially at the district level. The staff does not work for the government blindly 
and begins to emphasize the FIC's economic function and speaks onbehalf o f i t s 
members under the pressure of them. 
The SELA and PEA are established as the bridge between the government and 
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the private sector. They are one group of people under two different signboards. 
Their function is mainly to assist the BICA to control and regulate individual laborers 
and private enterprises and that function does not fade out with the development of 
the private economy. Although there is no functional change in essence, the SELA 
and PEA changed the slogans of their services from "three characters" to “eight 
words". In recent years, the revenue of the SELA and PEA entirely comes from 
membership fee and most working staff is recruited from society. But the influence 
of the state is still there. The SELA and PEA are under supervision of the BICA. The 
BICA approves the annual plan and the associations will not do anything that is not 
allowed by the bureau. The SELA and PEA are social organizations which claim to 
have dual control and representative functions. But the representative function is 
weak. The staff focuses its control function in the daily work and regards the 
associations as "work units" for those self-employed laborers. Thus they care more 
about providing some welfare to the members such as giving towels and soaps. They 
do not pay much attention to the members' interests and members hold the 
association in very low regard and express it is the last place they go for help. The 
SELA and PEA are more like government appendages instead of social organizations. 
They are new elements of the state's administrative system in the context of the 
economic reform. 
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The PEA is a group member of the FIC. And there is duplication of activities 
between the FIC and the PEA in many instances. But it is observed that there seems 
to be a lack of coordination and cooperation between the two associations at the 
working level. Although the FIC and the PEA feel some competition from each other, 
it does not have much influence on their daily work. That is because they believe 
they have their own advantages: the FIC has more representative power while the 
PEA emphasizes its economic function. The perceived advantages come from their 
relationship with the state: the FIC is a people's organization with the united front 
function and the PEA is a quasi-governmental organization. 
Table 6.1 Comparison of the FIC, the SELA and PEA in Shanghai 
The FIC The SELA and PEA 
Establishment By the state in 1950s By the state in 1980s and 
1990s 
Supervision Unit United Front Department The Bureau of Industrial and 
Commercial Administration 
Objective To unite and educate To control and regulate 
members members 
Organizational Different departments; Simple 
Structure complex 
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Personnel All are civil servants Most are recruited from 
society 
Funding Government appropriation Membership fee 
+Membership fee 
Membership Voluntary Compulsory 
Programme Decided by itself Approved by the BICA 
In conclusion, the Federation of Industry and Commerce, the Self-Employed 
Laborers Association and Private Enterprises Association are three private business 
associations set up by the government. The state's initiative in establishing them is 
different. The FIC is aimed to unite and educate the high-profile private enterprises 
which are out of the state's administrative system. When interacting with the state, 
those successful private enterprises make advantage of their power to force the FIC 
to represent their interests in recent years. The SELA and PEA were set up to control 
and regulate those self-employed laborers and small-scale private enterprises which 
were the outcome of the economic reform. The control function is prior to the 
representative one in the daily work of the SELA and PEA. And it is better to regard 
them as new elements of the administrative system in the context of China's 
economic reform. The state seems to adopt two different strategies when coping with 
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the constituency of private sector: for those high-profile and successful ones the state 
unites them and incorporates them to the policy-making process; for those 
small-scale private enterprises the state controls and regulates them. Thus we cannot 
summarize the relationship between private business associations and the state 
simply. The relationship between the FIC and the state fits a corporatist framework 
and is still changing. There is no essential change in the relationship between the 
SELA and PEA and the state. They are just government appendages under the mask 
of social organizations. Because all the three associations have close relationship 
with the state, they are not part of a civil society in western concept. 
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Appendix I: Profile of the Interview 
Number Date District Position Gender 
1 28 June 2004 Zha Bei Vice head of General Office of Male 
the BICA 
2 28 June 2004 Zha Bei Secretary general of the PEA Female 
3 29 June 2004 Zha Bei Head of Membership Male 
Department of the FIC 
4 29 June 2004 Zha Bei Individual laborer running Male 
bicycle accessories 
5 29 June 2004 Zha Bei Individual laborer running Male 
hardware 
6 29 June 2004 Zha Bei Individual laborer running Male 
household electronic 
implements 
7 29 June 2004 Zha Bei Individual laborer running Female 
labor implements 
8 29 June 2004 Zha Bei Individual laborer running Male 
air-conditioning 
9 30 June 2004 Shanghai Head of Marketing Department Male 
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of the BICA 
10 1 July 2004 Chang Secretary general of the SELA Female 
Ning 
11 1 July 2004 Chang Vice president of the PEA Male 
Ning 
12 5 July 2004 Shanghai Secretary general of the SELA Male 
13 6 July 2004 PuTuo Vice president of the SELA Male 
14 6 July 2004 Chang Head of General Office of Male 
Ning Shanghai Lian Feng 
Technology Investment 
Company Ltd. 
15 7 July 2004 Shanghai Vice head of Study & Research Male 
Office of the FIC 
16 8 July 2004 Yang Pu Vice director general of the Male 
BICA 
17 8 July 2004 Yang Pu President of the PEA Male 
18 8 July 2004 Yang Pu Vice head of Membership Female 
Department of the FIC 
19 9 July 2004 Zha Bei President of Shanghai Sanei Male 
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Elevator Company Ltd. 
20 12 July 2004 Hong Secretary general of the PEA Female 
Kou 
21 12 July 2004 Hong President of Shanghai CZJ Male 
Kou Environment Artistry 
Decoration Company Ltd. 
22 13 July 2004 Chang Vice secretary general of the Male 
Ning FIC 
23 14 July 2004 Shanghai Vice chairman of the FIC Male 
24 21 July 2004 Hong Head of General Office of the Female 
Kou FIC 
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Appendix II: Interview Questions for the FIC, the SELA 
and PEA 
1. Why was the association established by the state? 
2. What were the functions of the association at its early establishment? Are there 
any functional changes in recent years? 
3. What is the membership of the association? How many members are there in the 
association? 
4. How about the funding and spending of the association? 
5. What is the leader selection process in the association? How many working staff 
are there in the association and where do they come from? 
6. What is the relationship between the association and its upper level chapter? 
7. Can the association represent the members' interests? If yes, from which aspect? 
If no, why? 
8. What is the relationship among the FIC, the SELA and PEA? Is there any 
cooperation among the three associations? 
9. What is the relationship between the association and its supervision unit? 
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Appendix III: Interview Questions for Members 
1. Can the association (the FIC, the SELA or the PEA) represent your interest? And 
why? 
2. When you were in difficulty, would you ask help from the association? And why? 
3. Why did you join the association? (If the membership is no longer compulsory, 
will you still join the SELA or the PEA? And why?) 
4. What is the relationship between you and the association? 
5. What kind of services and information do you want to get from the association? 
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Appendix IV: Interview Questions for the BICA 
1. What is the relationship between the BICA and the SELA and PEA? 
2. Can the SELA and PEA represent members' interests? And why? 
3. What is the relationship among the FIC, the SELA and PEA? Are there any 
interactions among the three associations? 
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